New Hours Restrictions For Truck Drivers To Take Effect In July Of 2013

The U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has released new rules for CDL drivers that limit the number of hours per week drivers are permitted to work. The new rules are designed to combat driver fatigue and go into effect in July of 2013.

Under the new rules, truck drivers are prohibited from working more than 70 hours in a week. Currently, the restriction is set at 82 hours per week. When a driver reaches the 70 hour maximum, the driver must take at least two nights of rest from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. Drivers must also take a 30 minute break after working 8 hours and are restricted to no more than 11 hours of daily driving.

 

Employers should begin to put mechanisms in place in 2012 in preparation for compliance with the new rules. The new rules provide for fines against companies of up to $11,000 per violation. In addition, drivers are subject to penalties of up to $2,750 per offense.

OFCCP Proposes Rule Targeting Hiring of Disabled

The Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), proposed a new rule on Thursday, December 8, 2011, that would require federal contractors and subcontractors to set a hiring goal of having 7 percent of their workforces made up of disabled people. The rule amends Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which obligates federal contractors and subcontractors to ensure equal employment opportunities for qualified workers with disabilities.

Under the proposed rule, contractors would be required to do the following:

  • For the first time, set a goal of having 7 percent of their employees be workers with disabilities in each job group of the contractors’ workforce.
  • Request that applicants voluntarily self identify at the pre-offer stage as an “individual with a disability”. Applicants would also be asked to voluntarily self identify at the post-offer stage, and annually contractors would be required to survey all employees in order to invite them to self identify in an anonymous manner.
  • Maintain records of all individuals with disabilities applying for positions and the number of individuals with disabilities hired.
  • Engage in a minimum of three specific types of outreach and recruitment efforts to recruit individuals with disabilities.
  • List job openings with One-Stop Career Centers and other appropriate employment delivery services.

The proposed rule would apply to contractors with 50 or more employees and contracts worth $50,000 or more. The rule is open for public comment for 60 days after publication.

We will continue to keep our contractor clients apprised of the status of this proposed rule.

Two New Tax Credits For Employers Who Hire Veterans

On November 21, 2011, President Obama signed into law two tax credits designed to bring unemployed veterans back to work. These new tax credits were part of the American Jobs Act propsed by the President in September.

 

The Returning Heroes Tax Credit offers a credit scaled to the length of time a veteran has been unemployed. A credit of up to $2,400 (40 percent of the first $6,000 in wages) is available when a newly-hired veteran had been unemployed at least four weeks. A credit of up to $5,600 (40 percent of the first $14,000 in wages) is available when a newly-hired veteran had been unemployed at least six months. This tax credit replaces the now-expired Recovery Act credit, which provided for up to $2,400 for employers hiring certain unemployed veterans.

 

The Wounded Warrior Tax Credit, meanwhile, provides a new credit of up to $9,600 (40 percent of the first $24,000 in wages) for employers who hire veterans with service-connected disabilities who had been unemployed longer than six months. This credit exists alongside the existing Work Opportunity Tax Credit, which provides up to $4,800 for all employers who hire veterans with service-connected disabilities. The Wounded Warrior credit essentially replaces the Work Opportunity credit for hires of long-term unemployed veterans.

 

These tax credits are part of a larger jobs initiative targeted at veterans. Among other executive actions, the Administration has created a job-match online resource, a Veterans Job Bank, and an assistance card for veterans seeking job counseling. Employers wishing to participate in the Job Bank may find further information here.

 

If you have questions about any of these initiatives, please do not hesitate to contact any member of our employment law group.

Retirement Plan Sponsors Face Extensive New Participant Disclosures in 2012 New Retirement Rules

Required disclosures of relevant employee benefit plan information to the plan’s participants has been one of the major themes of ERISA -- the federal law regulating employee benefits -- since its enactment in 1974. Benefit plan sponsors and administrators have long been preparing and distributing to participants summary plan descriptions, summaries of material modifications, summary annual reports, annual benefit statements, periodic account statements, notices to interested parties, and black-out notices, in the seemingly unending effort to ensure that plan participants are kept adequately informed of their benefits and their benefit plan rights. Notwithstanding these many established ERISA disclosure requirements, a new set of ERISA participant disclosure regulations have now been promulgated by the Department of Labor and will become effective in 2012. 
 
These new requirements are a specific reaction by the DOL to the increasing prevalence across the retirement plan landscape of so-called “participant-directed individual account plans.” These are plans, including most current-day 401(k) and 403(b) plans, under which each plan participant can direct the investment of the participant’s plan account among various investment alternatives. The new participant disclosure regulations summarized below apply only to plan administrators of such participant-directed retirement plans, not to those of traditional defined benefit pension plans or individual account plans without participant-directed investments. 
 
What types of disclosures are required by the new rules? 
The new regulations require written disclosure of two types of information: (1) plan-related information, and (2) investment-related information.

 
What is the required plan-related information? 
First, general plan information must be provided to each participant or beneficiary before he or she can first direct plan investments, and at least annually thereafter, including:
 
  • the circumstances under which investment instructions can be given;
     
  • any plan limitations on investment instructions, including any restrictions on transfers in and out of an investment alternative;
     
  • plan provisions relating to voting or tender or similar rights appurtenant to any investment alternative;
     
  • an identification of all investment alternatives available under the plan;
     
  • an identification of any investment managers designated under the plan and;
     
  • a description of any plan provisions allowing investment outside of the menu of investments designated as available under the plan (e.g., “brokerage windows” or “separate brokerage accounts”).
     
     
    Second, before a participant or beneficiary can first direct investments, and at least annually thereafter, he or she must be given an explanation of plan administrative expenses (e.g., accounting, recordkeeping and legal expenses) that may be charged to an individual plan account, and how those expenses are allocated (e.g., pro rata or per capita). At least quarterly, the participant or beneficiary is to receive a specific statement that includes the dollar amount of such administrative fees charged to the individual’s account in the prior quarter and the administrative services to which the charges relate.
     
    And third, before a participant or beneficiary can first direct investments, and at least annually thereafter, he or she must be given an explanation of any individual fees and expenses (such as participant loan fees, QDRO processing fees, “brokerage window” fees and individual investment advisor fees) that may be charged against the individual account of a participant or beneficiary who incurs the fee rather than against all accounts. Here again, at least quarterly, the participant or beneficiary is to receive a specific statement that includes the dollar amount of such individual account expenses actually charged in the prior quarter and the types of individual account expenses incurred. 
     
    In the case of changes in any of the plan-related information summarized above after disclosures are provided, the participants and beneficiaries are to be given an advance description of the changes within the 30- to 90-day period preceding the effective date of the change.
     
    What is the required investment-related information? 
    There are two sets of investment-related disclosures, one consisting of information to be distributed to participants automatically each year and the other of information to be provided upon participant request. The automatic disclosure includes historical investment performance data relating to each investment alternative available under the plan, which must be provided in a comparative, essentially side-by-side manner (the regulations include a suggested format for this presentation). The disclosure includes identifying information, such as fund name; its type or category; one, five and ten calendar years of investment performance results; one, five and ten calendar years of performance results for an appropriate benchmark; applicable fee and expense information; and any purchase, transfer or withdrawal restrictions or limitations that may be imposed. The plan administrator must also provide a website address that participants can access for additional details, and a glossary of investment-related terms (or internet access to such a glossary). 
     
    The investment-related information to be provided upon request includes copies of prospectuses, copies of any other materials relating to an investment alternative that may have been provided by the investment alternative to the plan, a statement of the value of a share or unit of each investment alternative, and a list of assets held in the portfolio of each investment alternative that meets the DOL’s definition of a “plan asset,” including their value. 
     
    When must these newly-required participant disclosures be made? 
    This new DOL participant disclosure regulation is effective for plan years that begin on and after November 1, 2011 (therefore, for calendar year plans, they are effective January 1, 2012, subject to the transition relief described below). The general rule regarding the plan-related and investment-related disclosures described above is that they are to be provided to participants on or before the date the participant can first direct his or her investments, and then at least once per year thereafter. The individualized participant statements relating to fees charged to his or her account are required each quarter. 
     
    What are the transition deadlines for 2012 when the new disclosure requirements first become applicable? 
    The initial disclosures of the annually-required plan-related and investment-related information is required by the 61st day of the first plan year that begins on or after November 1, 2011 or, if later, by May 31, 2012. The initial quarterly disclosures of the fees charged to individual plan accounts are due 45 days after the end of the quarter when the plan first has to provide the annual plan-related and investment-related disclosures. Therefore, the typical calendar year plan will have until May 31, 2012 to make the initial annual disclosures, and the initial quarterly statement deadline for such a plan will be August 14, 2012. 
     
    What penalties apply if the new disclosure requirements are not met? 
    There is no defined and automatic monetary penalty payable to participants or the DOL if the new required disclosures are not timely or fully provided. However this disclosure obligation is a fiduciary duty imposed by the regulation on the plan administrator. A failure by the plan administrator to satisfy this obligation will open the door to legal claims by participants who suffer investment losses on grounds that the non-disclosure of the required information was a breach of a clearly-defined fiduciary duty which resulted in those losses.
     
    What steps should retirement plan administrators take now to prepare for these new disclosure obligations?
    Confirm whether the plan is a participant-directed individual account plan and therefore subject to these new disclosure rules. Meet with the relevant plan vendors (trustees, record keepers and third party administrators) to establish who will bear responsibility for compiling and providing the new required disclosures, and to coordinate between the plan administrator and vendors the compilation of data that will go into the required disclosures. This may require renegotiation of service provider contracts, with one or more vendors taking on this disclosure responsibility. 
     
    Since employees who are eligible to participate must receive the disclosures, even if they have not as yet elected to participate, plan administrators must identify these eligible non-participants and ensure that any vendor sending disclosures has their information. 
     
    Consider and settle upon a distribution method or methods that will be used for disseminating disclosures, including such alternatives as hard-copy versus electronic distribution, mail versus workplace delivery, and coordination of delivery with other already-required disclosures such as annual or quarterly account statements or summary annual reports.
     
    If the plan has any unique or plan-specific investment alternatives, such as an employer stock fund or a guaranteed investment contract, the plan administrator must pay particular attention to who will take the lead in compiling the data and preparing the disclosures related to that plan-specific investment alternative. 
     
    For more information, or if you have questions or require any assistance in connection with the new self-directed plan disclosure requirements, please contact a member of the Employee Benefits Group. 

The NLRB's Agenda = Employers Under Attack

As indicated in our two recent client alerts, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been extremely activist in promoting a pro-Union agenda. In fact, it wouldn’t be a stretch to refer to the agency as currently constituted as the “National Labor Relations Union.” Prior to this most recent activism, the NLRB had two primary functions: (1) to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices, regardless of whether committed by labor unions or employers; and (2) to establish whether certain groups of employees wanted union representation for collective-bargaining purposes. However, the NLRB’s recent measures indicate an intent to substantially deviate from its statutorily-mandated duties as an objective investigatory agency.
 
By way of reminder, when appointed to the NLRB by the Obama administration, Craig Becker made it quite clear that he intended to use the NLRB’s rulemaking process to enact provisions and positions favorable to his labor unions. 
 
Since his appointment, which gave the Board a 2-1 democratic majority, Becker has attempted to use his currently unchecked authority (he was a recess appointment by President Obama and, as such, was neither confirmed nor approved by either party) to propose rules undercutting an employer’s ability to manage its workforce. The NLRB’s proposed rules placing more obligations and expense on employers are particularly troubling in light of the current economy.
 
In an attempt to implement its agenda, the NLRB has proposed several recent rules and regulations of which employers must be aware. Specifically,
 
1. The NLRB issued a Final Rule that will require employers to notify employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as of November 14, 2011. However, on October 5, 2011, the agengy agreed to postpone implementation of the posting requirement until January 31, 2012. Private-sector employers whose workplaces fall under the NLRA will be required to post the employee rights notice where other workplace notices are typically posted. Also, employers who customarily post notices to employees regarding personnel rules or policies on an internet or intranet site will be required to post the notice on those sites. The notice states, among other things, that employees have the right to act together to improve wages and working conditions, to form, join and assist a union, to bargain collectively with their employer, refrain from any of these activities, strike and picket or choose not to do any of these activities. It also informs employees of their right to solicit during their non-work time, to be free of interrogation and discrimination related to union activities, and to wear union hats, buttons, tee shirts, and pins. 
 
Penalties for employers who fail to post the notice may be severe. First, failure to post the required notice is an unfair labor practice itself. The second sanction is the tolling of the statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice charge against employers who fail to post the notice. The normal statute of limitations is six months, but it may be extended when no notice has been posted. Finally, the Board will hold that knowingly and willfully failing to post notices may provide evidence of unlawful motive in unfair labor practice cases.
 
Although the NLRB did not directly address the issue of whether an employer may post a notice of the company’s position at the same location, there appears to be nothing per se illegal about this practice; however, you should have legal counsel review such a notice prior to posting.
 
2. A proposed rule would significantly reduce the time period for a union election and impose substantially shortened timeframes for the production of documents. For example, employers would need to produce an electronic voter list within two days (as opposed to seven, under the current rules) after the filing of a petition. Employers would also be required to include in the voter list an employee’s name, telephone number, email address, physical address, work location, shift, and classification. Moreover, the proposed rules would expedite the hearing process and a hearing officer would be required to close a hearing if he or she concludes that “the only issues remaining in dispute concern the eligibility or inclusion of individuals who would constitute less than 20 percent of the unit if they were found to be eligible to vote.” The cumulative effect of the changes has been predicted to take the average time between petition and election from its current 38 days to approximately 20-23 days. This will obviously give employers less time to communicate with employees about the negatives of unions after a petition is filed and presumably boost the likelihood that a union could win an NLRB election.
 
Ultimately, employers have a legitimate and substantial interest in NLRB rules and procedures which includes the right of the employer to communicate with its employees about unions. If this proposed rule becomes effective, a union may conduct an organizing campaign for weeks or months without an employer becoming aware of it, frame the election, communicate with employees and prepare for legal issues to the significant detriment of an employer.
 
Please be advised that if employers currently do not engage in ongoing communication about unions as part of their regular communications to employees -- DO IT NOW. Further, employers need to be prepared immediately at the commencement of union organizing to roll out a solid communications strategy. 
 
3. Finally, the NLRB has proposed a drastic expansion of the definition of “persuasion” to include numerous common human resource and legal activities which would substantially impact current basic employer activities. With respect to restrictions regarding legal counsel, any involvement by the employer’s attorney in suggesting or preparing campaign literature or other communications would make the attorney a “persuader” within the meaning of the law, and would require the attorney and his or her firm to file detailed reports, including reporting on their finances, to the DOL. If adopted, these regulations would require labor lawyers to determine whether to meet the burdensome requirements of the DOL in order to continue to assist their clients in organizing campaigns, or to abandon that type of work entirely. 
 
Significantly, the proposed rule also requires employers subject to this requirement to report receipts and disbursements of any kind “on account of labor relations advice and services.” Accordingly, there would be substantial new recordkeeping and reporting requirements for employers. To comply with these onerous requirements, potentially on every occasion an employer engages an attorney or a consultant, reporting would be required. Accordingly, the costs associated with compliance could truly be staggering.
 
Please contact a member of Barley Snyder’s employment group with any questions regarding this proposed legislation and for advice on a course of action to ensure legal compliance.

NLRB Delays Implementation of Notice-Posting Rule

On October 6th, the NLRB announced that it has postponed the implementation date for its new notice-posting rule by more than two months, until January 31, 2012. By way of reminder, the NLRB’s Final Rule regarding this issue required all employers subject to coverage under the National Labor Relations Act to post a notice in the workplace informing employees of their right, among other things, to act together to improve wages and working conditions, to form, join and assist a union, to bargain collectively with their employer, refrain from any of these activities, strike and picket or choose not to do any of these activities. It also informs employees of their right to solicit during their non-work time, to be free of interrogation and discrimination related to union activities, and to wear union hats, buttons, tee shirts, and pins.
 
Although the NLRB’s stated reason for the postponement is to “allow for enhanced education and outreach to employers,” in reality, the postponement is a result of lawsuits filed by a number of organizations, including, but not limited to, the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Right to Work Foundation, opposing the posting requirement. On December 19, the court will hear oral arguments on the parties’ respective motions regarding implementation of the Final Rule.
 
We will keep you advised as to any further developments with respect to this matter; however, at this time, we are recommending that employers refrain from posting the notice until such time as the court rules upon the issue.

NLRB Issues Final Rule Requiring Employers to Post Notice to Inform Employees of Union Related Rights

In January of this year we sent a Client Alert regarding proposed rule making by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) which, if adopted, would require employers to post a notice informing employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The proposed rule has now become final. As we noted then, this is a move by the Obama Administration to ensure that all employees of businesses covered by the NLRA will be able to read about their rights to unionize on their employer’s bulletin board in a notice that must be posted at all times in the workplace. The notice, among other things, states that employees have the right to:

- Organize a union to negotiate with the employer concerning wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment
- Form, join, or assist a union. 
- Discuss wages, benefits and terms and conditions of employment or union organizing with coworkers or union.
- Take action with one or more coworkers to improve working conditions by raising work related compalints directly with the employer or with a government agency and seek help from a union. 
- Strike and picket.
- Choose not to do any of these activities.
 
 
The poster also informs employees of their right to solicit during their non-work time, to be free of interrogation and discrimination related to union activities, and to wear union hats, buttons, tee shirts, and pins. It also informs employees that the employer cannot promise or grant benefits to discourage employees from unionizing, or spy on or videotape peaceful union activities.
 

Think Twice Before Disciplining Employees For What They Say On The Internet... The NLRB Is Watching

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recently issued two complaints against employers for terminating employees who criticized their working conditions on Facebook. 
 
These complaints come on the heels of the settlement of the NLRB’s first “Facebook firing” complaint last October against Connecticut-based American Medical Response, Inc. (“AMR”). In that case, an AMR supervisor denied an employee’s request for union assistance in responding to an investigatory review. The employee, an emergency medical technician, subsequently posted critical comments about the supervisor on Facebook, to which other employees responded supportively. AMR fired the employee pursuant to its social media policy, which prohibited employees from making “disparaging, discriminatory, or defamatory comments when discussing the Company or the employee’s superiors” and depicting the company “in any way” through pictures posted on the Internet. The NLRB alleged that the employee’s conduct was protected, concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Section 7”) and that AMR’s actions and social media policy were unlawful. 
 
By way of background, Section 7 protects an employee’s “right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection,” which includes discussing the terms and conditions of employment with co-workers. The AMR case settled privately before a hearing could be conducted, so employers were left without a bright line as to what point employee speech becomes protected speech.
 
Two recent complaints confirm that the AMR case was not an isolated incident, and that the NLRB is taking very seriously employees’ protected speech rights in social media. In a recent case in Illinois, In re Karl Knauz BMW, Case No. 13-CA-046452, the NLRB filed a complaint against a Chicago-based car dealership after it fired a salesman for criticizing the company on Facebook. The employee was displeased with the quality of food served at a customer event, which he and other sales representatives felt would hurt commissions. After posting to Facebook pictures of the allegedly sub-par food and comments disparaging the event, the dealership fired the employee. Similarly, in a recent case in New York, In re Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. Case No. 03-CA-027872, the NLRB issued a complaint against a Buffalo-area non-profit after it fired five employees for “concertedly complaining” on Facebook about their working conditions. One employee alleged in the Facebook post that some of her co-workers did not do enough to assist clients, prompting other employees to join the online discussion to complain about staffing and work load issues.
 
In all three complaints, the NLRB has contended that the employees’ conduct is protected speech under Section 7 as a discussion of his or her terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, the NLRB complaints target both the actual termination of the employees engaged in such activity, and the employers’ “overly broad” social media policies. More complaints will no doubt be issued in the near future. In fact, the NLRB’s general counsel recently indicated that each of the NLRB’s 52 regional offices has a pending social media case. Although it still remains unclear exactly where the line is between protected and unprotected online speech, a few things are clear from the NLRB complaints alone. First, employers should be aware that Section 7 protections apply to both union and nonunion employees alike--although the EMT from Connecticut was a union member, the car salesman from Illinois was not. In addition, a total ban on employees’ making critical comments about their supervisors or co-workers through social media is impermissible. NLRB rulings outside the social media context have invalidated policies that could “reasonably be construed by employees to bar employees from discussing with their coworkers complaints about their managers that affect working conditions.” KLS Claremont Resort, 344 NLRB 832, 836 (2005). The Board’s general counsel has suggested that social media policies are no different, characterizing online employee discussions as the 21st century equivalent of conversations at the office water cooler. 
 
Thus, employers should clearly indicate in their policies that any restrictions on social media usage should not be construed as limiting an employee’s right to discuss his or her terms and conditions of employment with co-workers regardless of whether the workplace is unionized. Employers should also take care when disciplining employees for online chatter that relates--even tenuously--to their terms and conditions of employment, including comments that criticize or even insult company superiors. Employers do not need to tolerate speech that defames or harasses co-workers or supervisors for purely personal reasons. Nor do they have to accept speech that disparages company products or reveals confidential information. However, where online dialogue addresses employees’ working conditions, and is or has the potential to be joined by other employees, the NLRB will likely view this as protected speech.

Independent Contractor Misclassification and the Rise in Class Actions

As Congress and state governments look to fill holes created by lowered revenue, they are taking aim at companies using “independent contractors” by increasing regulations and targeting entities such as the trucking industry.  In addition to increased regulation, class action lawsuits by “independent contractors” alleging they should be classified as employees have proliferated. In fact, class actions brought by “independent contractors” rose 50% in 2010. Despite this complex atmosphere, companies using independent contractors can take steps to avoid costly fines and legal fees resulting from misclassification.
 
In April, three Democratic senators introduced the Payroll Fraud Prevention Act (PFPA), a watered-down version of the Employee Misclassification Prevention Act (EMPA), a bill that died in committee last year. Unlike the EMPA, the PFPA does not impose new recordkeeping requirements on companies, but like the EMPA, the new bill seeks to impose fines of up to $5,000 per misclassified employee. Even for smaller employers, these fines can add up quickly and additional penalties for willful behavior can worsen the impact. If this bill passes, companies would be required to inform independent contractors of their status and direct them to the Department of Labor website for filing misclassification complaints.
 
Even without the PFPA enacted, federal regulators like the IRS have increasingly turned the spotlight on companies that use independent contractors. The IRS announced it will audit over 6,000 randomly selected businesses during the next three years to detect misclassification. The Teamsters and other labor groups have seen the increased regulation as an opportunity to encourage misclassified independent contractors to unionize.
 
In addition, as reported previously, on top of the increased federal regulation, Pennsylvania recently adopted the Construction Work place Misclassification Act (CWMA) which requires that independent contractors meet a three-part test to maintain their classification. The test requires an independent contractor to [1] have a written contract to perform services, [2] be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, and [3] be customarily engaged in an independently established trade. Violations of this law can lead to fines of up to $2,500 per employee and criminal prosecution. While this act only affects the construction industry, acts like the CWMA appear to be the growing trend nationwide (e.g., New York passed a similar law in 2010).
 
With respect to the litigation front, several trucking companies are presently facing class action suits resulting in costly settlements and legal fees. In one recent example, truck drivers in Washington and Oregon received a $2.25 million settlement after claiming 3P Delivery had misclassified them as independent contractors. Among the allegations were that 3P Delivery required drivers to fill out applications, disallowed substitute drivers, and controlled the workload of the drivers. Further, in February 2011, truck drivers classified as independent contractors filed a class action suit against Sears alleging that Sears controlled how the drivers completed their work and required them to purchase or lease trucks with the Sears logo and wear a Sears uniform.
 
Moreover, for companies in search of “quick fixes,” simply having independent contractors sign an agreement acknowledging their status is not the definitive or determining factor in resolving the issue. In the 2010 case of Narayan v. EGL, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that truck drivers who had signed acknowledgements were not actually independent contractors based on the amount of control the company exercised over them.
 
Despite increasing complexity, the independent contractor classification is still a viable option and continues to be the best option for many companies. However, in order to avoid litigation, it is vital to adhere to the requirements set forth in the regulations and the advice and recommendation of counsel. Specifically, the most important principle is that the independent contractor, and not the company, has the right to control the manner and means by which the work is performed. To that end, companies must recognize that the DOL will look beyond the actual agreement to the substance of these relationships. If your relationship with independent contractors seems inconsistent with any of principles set forth above, it may be time to restructure the relationship to steer clear of potential litigation. 

Think Twice Before Disciplining Employees For What They Say On The Internet... The NLRB Is Watching

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recently issued two complaints against employers for terminating employees who criticized their working conditions on Facebook. 
 
These complaints come on the heels of the settlement of the NLRB’s first “Facebook firing” complaint last October against Connecticut-based American Medical Response, Inc. (“AMR”). In that case, an AMR supervisor denied an employee’s request for union assistance in responding to an investigatory review. The employee, an emergency medical technician, subsequently posted critical comments about the supervisor on Facebook, to which other employees responded supportively. AMR fired the employee pursuant to its social media policy, which prohibited employees from making “disparaging, discriminatory, or defamatory comments when discussing the Company or the employee’s superiors” and depicting the company “in any way” through pictures posted on the Internet. The NLRB alleged that the employee’s conduct was protected, concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Section 7”) and that AMR’s actions and social media policy were unlawful. 
 
By way of background, Section 7 protects an employee’s “right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection,” which includes discussing the terms and conditions of employment with co-workers. The AMR case settled privately before a hearing could be conducted, so employers were left without a bright line as to what point employee speech becomes protected speech.
 
Two recent complaints confirm that the AMR case was not an isolated incident, and that the NLRB is taking very seriously employees’ protected speech rights in social media. In a recent case in Illinois, In re Karl Knauz BMW, Case No. 13-CA-046452, the NLRB filed a complaint against a Chicago-based car dealership after it fired a salesman for criticizing the company on Facebook. The employee was displeased with the quality of food served at a customer event, which he and other sales representatives felt would hurt commissions. After posting to Facebook pictures of the allegedly sub-par food and comments disparaging the event, the dealership fired the employee. Similarly, in a recent case in New York, In re Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. Case No. 03-CA-027872, the NLRB issued a complaint against a Buffalo-area non-profit after it fired five employees for “concertedly complaining” on Facebook about their working conditions. One employee alleged in the Facebook post that some of her co-workers did not do enough to assist clients, prompting other employees to join the online discussion to complain about staffing and work load issues.
 
In all three complaints, the NLRB has contended that the employees’ conduct is protected speech under Section 7 as a discussion of his or her terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, the NLRB complaints target both the actual termination of the employees engaged in such activity, and the employers’ “overly broad” social media policies. More complaints will no doubt be issued in the near future. In fact, the NLRB’s general counsel recently indicated that each of the NLRB’s 52 regional offices has a pending social media case. Although it still remains unclear exactly where the line is between protected and unprotected online speech, a few things are clear from the NLRB complaints alone. First, employers should be aware that Section 7 protections apply to both union and nonunion employees alike--although the EMT from Connecticut was a union member, the car salesman from Illinois was not. In addition, a total ban on employees’ making critical comments about their supervisors or co-workers through social media is impermissible. NLRB rulings outside the social media context have invalidated policies that could “reasonably be construed by employees to bar employees from discussing with their coworkers complaints about their managers that affect working conditions.” KLS Claremont Resort, 344 NLRB 832, 836 (2005). The Board’s general counsel has suggested that social media policies are no different, characterizing online employee discussions as the 21st century equivalent of conversations at the office water cooler. 
 
Thus, employers should clearly indicate in their policies that any restrictions on social media usage should not be construed as limiting an employee’s right to discuss his or her terms and conditions of employment with co-workers regardless of whether the workplace is unionized. Employers should also take care when disciplining employees for online chatter that relates--even tenuously--to their terms and conditions of employment, including comments that criticize or even insult company superiors. Employers do not need to tolerate speech that defames or harasses co-workers or supervisors for purely personal reasons. Nor do they have to accept speech that disparages company products or reveals confidential information. However, where online dialogue addresses employees’ working conditions, and is or has the potential to be joined by other employees, the NLRB will likely view this as protected speech.

Wal-Mart Fails to Overturn Award of $187.6 Million For Wage and Hour Violations

In the 2007 case of Braun v. Wal-Mart, one of the largest awards in a wage and hour class action in Pennsylvania history was levied against Wal-Mart. The award resulted in $187.6 million in back wages and damages to Pennsylvania employees who worked during what were promised to be paid rest breaks and who were forced to work off the clock. On June 10, 2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld this verdict against Wal-Mart, but sent the $45.6 million award of attorneys fees back to the trial court in Philadelphia for reconsideration.
 
In this highly publicized case, two former hourly workers filed suit on behalf of a class of approximately 187,000 current and former retail employees of Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club stores throughout Pennsylvania. The workers claimed that they were forced to work during what should have been paid rest breaks, and were not paid for off-the-clock work as specifically set forth in Wal-Mart’s employee manual and policies.

 
The claims arose primarily under Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL). However, unlike Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act, the WPCL does not in and of itself entitle employees to wages. Instead, the WPCL is an enforcement mechanism for employees when an employer allegedly breaches an agreement to pay wages. Notably, the WPCL includes a liquidated damages provision, the shifting of attorneys’ fees, as well as potential individual criminal liability for company officers.

 
In 2006, a jury found Wal-Mart failed to compensate the employees for missed rest breaks and hours worked off-the-clock, as mandated by its own corporate handbook and policies. The jury awarded the class $78.5 million in compensatory damages. In 2007, the trial court awarded an additional $62.2 million in statutory liquidated damages based on the jury’s finding that Wal-Mart knowingly saved millions of dollars by failing to fully compensate their employees. The jury also found that Wal-Mart lacked a good-faith basis for violating the WPCL, and, as such, Pennsylvania law required that the employer be assessed liquidated damages.

 
Wal-Mart argued that paid rest breaks are not wages under the WPCL and that no contractual agreement ever arose to pay for them. The Superior Court rejected both arguments. First, the Court held that payments for rest breaks pursuant to an “agreement” between an employer and employee constitute wages for purposes of the WPCL. In this case, the court found that a contractual agreement to pay such wages existed in Wal-Mart’s employee manual, which indicated that employees “are to take full, timely, uninterrupted breaks” and shall “receive compensation for break time at the applicable rate of pay.” Ultimately, the Court’s reasoning is best summed up as follows: “the WPCL does not permit an employer to escape liability when it receives the benefit of . . . an employee’s eight hours of labor when that employee agreed to be paid to work seven-and-a-half hours and to rest for one-half hour.” Read more...

 

OFCCP Settles First Administrative Complaint Of Sex Discrimination Based On Compensation

Clients who are federal contractors and subcontractors should take note of a recent settlement between the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca. The settlement is significant because it marks the first administrative complaint of sex discrimination filed by the OFCCP based on compensation.
 
The complaint, filed on May 6, 2010, alleged that AstraZeneca paid female Level III Pharmaceutical Sales Specialists at its office in Wayne, Pennsylvania significantly less per year than its male Level III Pharmaceutical Sales Specialists at the same location. The Complaint alleged that the salary disparity remained after adjusting for differences in legitimate pay-determining factors. On average, the salaries of female sales specialists were $1700 less than their male counterparts. The OFCCP demanded the Company pay lost wages, interest and front pay, and that it make adjustments to females’ salary, fringe benefits and seniority.
 
As part of the settlement, AstraZeneca will pay $250,000 to 124 women. The company also agreed to work with the OFCCP to conduct statistical analysis of the base pay of other individuals employed as sales specialists at locations in other states. The company agreed that if the analysis showed female employees were underpaid, the company would adjust their salaries.
 
The settlement follows what appears to be a renewed focus on the OFCCP to target compensation disparities in the contractor community. The OFCCP further is poised to issue new standards for evaluating compensation data. Indeed, on January 3, 2011, the OFCCP published a Notice of Proposed Rescission of its Compensation Standards. This Notice followed an unpublished written directive of the OFCCP issued strictly internally in December of 2010 that outlines the use of a “2 or 2” test for analyzing compensation data. Under this test, the OFCCP will look for discrepancies of 2% or $2,000 and, where such discrepancies exist, will require certain additional data to analyze whether a discriminatory pay practice exists.
 
It is critically import that government contractors and subcontractors conduct annual audits of their compensation practices and self correct where discrepancies are found. Our employment law group regularly assists contractors in auditing compensation data for OFCCP compliance. If you would like our assistance please contact Jennifer L. Craighead at 717-399-1523 or any member of our employment law group.

Employers Should Beware of "Ban the Box" Legislation

In April 2011, the City of Philadelphia enacted a new ordinance entitled the “Fair Criminal Record Screening Standards.” Referred to as the “ban the box” legislation because of its stated intent to ban the criminal history “box” on employment applications, the ordinance restricts employer inquiries regarding, and use of, criminal record information. Specifically, employers (defined as employing 10 or more persons) may not make an inquiry regarding or take adverse action based upon non-conviction information (arrests), and may not make any inquiry regarding criminal conviction information during the application process, before the first interview or during the first interview.
 
However, the ordinance does permit employers to process criminal background checks after the first interview has occurred. In addition, employers who are required to conduct background checks due to industry regulations or the nature of their business will be exempt from this new law.
 
Employers found in violation are subject to a fine, which is currently $2,000 for each violation. The Ordinance becomes effective July 13, 2011.
 
A number of cities, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, have recently enacted similar legislation. Although the Fair Criminal Record Screening Standards applies only to applicants who are applying for jobs in the City of Philadelphia, based on recent trends, employers throughout Pennsylvania should be prepared for potentially similar ordinances to be proposed in other localities throughout the Commonwealth in the future.
 
As it stands now, employers in the City of Philadelphia will need to remove questions regarding criminal convictions from their employment applications, and train those who interview applicants to refrain from inquiring as to criminal convictions during an applicant’s initial interview.

Employers vs. Independent Contractors: Know the New Law

On October 13, Governor Rendell signed into law the Construction Workplace Misclassification Act which makes it both a civil and a criminal offense for a contractor to knowingly misclassify an employee as an independent contractor. Pennsylvania joins several states that have taken similar measures to penalize employers that improperly classify workers as independent contractors to avoid paying certain taxes and other employee benefits.

 
The Act establishes criteria particular to the construction industry under which employees can be classified as independent contractors, including a requirement that the independent contractor maintain liability insurance. The Act also imposes both civil and criminal penalties for misclassification of workers, and requires employers to post notices in the workplace.

 
Which Employers Are Covered Under the Act?

Employers in the construction industry that are already subject to the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act and the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Act are covered by this new Act. The Act also extends liability to individual officers or agents of the employer. Construction is defined broadly as the “erection, reconstruction demolition, alteration, modification, custom fabrication, building, assembling, site preparation and repair work done on any real property or premises under contract, whether or not the work is for a public body and paid for from public funds.”

 
What Are The Criteria For Independent Contractor Status?

The Act establishes a three-part test that an individual must meet to be properly classified as an independent contractor: 
1. The individual must have a written contract to perform construction services;
2. The individual must be free from control or direction over the performance of those services, both under the contract and in fact; and
3 .The individual must be customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.
The Act also sets forth the six specific criteria that will determine whether an individual meets the third part of the test of being “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.”

The Act also sets forth the six specific criteria that will determine whether an individual meets the third part of the test of being "customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business."

1. The individual must possess the essential tools, equipment and other assets necessary to perform the services, independent of the employer.
2. The individual arrangement with the employer is such that the individual must realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of performing the services.
3. The individual must perform the services through a business in which the individual has a proprietary interest.
4. The individual must maintain a business location separate from the location of the employer.
5. The individual must:
                a. Have previously performed the same or similar services for another person, meeting
                the criteria 1 through 4 above, and while free from direction or control over the
                performance of the services; or
                b. Hold him or herself out to others as available and able
                to perform the same or similar services meeting the criteria of 1 through 4 above, and
                while free from direction or control over the performance of the services.
6. The individual must maintain liability insurance of at least $50,000 during the term of the contract.

 
What Penalties May Be Imposed For Violations Of The Act?

The failure to properly classify an individual subjects employers to civil penalties of up to $1,000 per misclassified employee for a first violation, and up to $2,500 per misclassified employee for each subsequent violation. Importantly, the Act also allows the Secretary of Labor and Industry to petition a court for a stop-work order requiring the cessation of work by those individuals who are misclassified, or if a majority of individuals at a worksite are misclassified, to petition for a cessation of all business operations of the employer at each site where a violation occurred. The stop-work order remains in effect until the court issues a release order.

 
In addition, the Act provides for criminal penalties for employers that violate the act and those who intentionally contract with such an employer knowing the employer intends to violate the Act. An intentional violation is a misdemeanor of the third degree for a first offense and a misdemeanor of the second degree for a subsequent offense. A negligent violation is a summary offense subject to a fine of not more than $1,000.

 
Does The Act Prohibit Retaliation?
Yes, the Act prohibits an employer from discriminating or taking an adverse action against any person who in good faith files a complaint or informs any person about an employer’s non-compliance with the Act. An adverse action within 90 days of the person’s complaint raises a rebuttable presumption of retaliation.

Supreme Court Backs Employee in Wage Complaint Case

Last week, in the case of Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., the United States  Supreme Court issued a ruling which will impact how an employer responds to complaints from employees regarding wage and hour issues.  Specifically, the Court ruled that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) may, under certain circumstances, shield workers from retaliation for verbal as well as written complaints.  Previously, some courts have interpreted to the FLSA’s retaliation provisions to apply only to written complaints to the Department of Labor, or in some cases, written complaints to an employer.  However, under this ruling, cautious employers now need to be aware that, if an employee raises a concern, in whatever form, about payment of overtime, calculation of time or any other payroll practice, the employer should be prepared to immediately address such complaints.  Furthermore, the complaining employee now enjoys a “super protected” status in that an adverse action taken against the employee such as termination will open the employer up to claims of retaliation; consequently, employers will need to ensure that their employment decisions can be well defended against claims of retaliation.
 

Court Holds that Employees Cannot Immediately Sue for Alleged Wrongful Denial of Stimulus Package's COBRA Premium Subsidy

 

If you work in the field of human resources or employee benefits, you are doubtlessly familiar with the COBRA premium subsidy provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which provides a 65% reduction in COBRA premiums for employees involuntarily terminated from their jobs, or who have had their working hours substantially reduced, during the period from September 1, 2008 through May 31, 2010.  Employers are required to notify “assistance eligible employees” of their ARRA rights and, if they submit the required paperwork, reduce their COBRA premium by 65%, the cost of which the employer can recover through a tax credit.  The law also sets up an expedited process for employees to challenge denials of the premium subsidy by filing an appeal with the United States Secretary of Labor, who must issue a decision within 15 business days after receiving the appeal.  The employee can challenge the Secretary of Labor’s decision in court, but the Secretary’s decision is entitled to deference from the court.

On April 27, 2010, in a case of first impression, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that employees cannot short-circuit the appeal process by suing in court for denial of the COBRA premium subsidy.  In Dorsey v. Jacobson Holman, PLLC, Ms. Dorsey’s employment ended on September 16, 2007, at which time she elected to continue her health insurance coverage through COBRA.  On April 10, 2009, Ms. Dorsey requested that  Jacobson Holman provide the premium subsidy, claiming that she had been terminated.  Jacobson Holman refused, arguing that Ms. Dorsey she had voluntarily resigned.  Ms. Dorsey  followed up informally with a Department of Labor benefits advisor, but never filed an official appeal with the Secretary of Labor challenging the denial of her request for the COBRA premium subsidy.  Instead, she filed an action against Jacobson Holman in federal district court alleging violation of the ARRA’s COBRA subsidy provisions.

The court, however, dismissed the case, holding that Ms. Dorsey failed to properly exhaust her administrative remedies by filing an appeal with the Secretary of Labor.  The court described the ARRA as emergency legislation designed to get benefits into the hands of assistance eligible individuals quickly and noted that the required 15-day deadline for processing appeals furthered that goal.  On the other hand, “[i]t blunts that purpose to require – or allow – individuals to turn in the first instance to the courts.”    

For employers, this is good news.  They need not face the specter of frequent, and expensive, court challenges to decisions regarding whether separated employees are – or are not – eligible for the ARRA’s COBRA subsidy.  Rather, challenges to those decisions will usually get resolved through the Secretary of Labor’s relatively quick and cheap appeals process.    

E-Discovery in Employment Litigation: It's Not Just for Plantiffs Anymore

In Seybert v. International Group, Inc., Jane Seybert filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania claiming that her supervisor, Brett Marchand, subjected her to gender-based harassment. Seybert testified that during a work-sponsored dinner, attended by co-workers and other supervisors, Marchand stated loudly in reference to a chocolate fountain dessert, “I heard it’s really good if you go down deep, into the chocolate, with your berry,” which Seybert contended was a sexual metaphor.

As the matter proceeded to trial, International Group produced several emails that Seybert exchanged using her work email account during working hours. Many of these emails featured stories, jokes, cartoons and photographs employing sexual words, metaphors and double entendres. Seybert’s attorneys filed a motion to prevent International Group from using the emails at trial, citing a federal rule of evidence that limits the use of “sexual disposition” evidence.

The judge, however, rejected the argument, stating that “[b]y exchanging these emails with others during her . . . work hours, and using IGI computers, Mrs. Seybert may have been sanctioning the humor that the emails contained – a humor that may be found similar to the supposed humor underlying Mr. Marchand’s comment at the . . . dinner.” The court also noted that the emails did not comment directly on Seybert’s own sexual history or conduct, but mostly contained jokes and stories about generic topics or made-up characters, like Santa Claus.

The jury apparently found this evidence persuasive. On November 6, it entered judgment in favor of International Group.

Just like for plaintiffs, email evidence can sometimes provide important information for an employer defending an employment discrimination lawsuit. Employers can take advantage of some of these benefits—and limit some of the costs associated with E-Discovery in employment litigation—by adopting policies that require the long term retention of departing employees’ email accounts. Who knows? It might just be your “smoking gun” in the end.
 

OSHA Enforcement And Regulatory Changes Underway

Unlike the previous administration’s willingness to work with employers to resolve Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) complaints, under the Obama administration, OSHA intends to become more active in regulation promulgation and enforcement. Specifically, a pronouncement by President Obama’s new Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis, encapsulates the new focus: “As I have said since my first day on the job, ... the U.S. Department of Labor is back in the enforcement business,” Solis said. “There will be no excuses for negligence.... And so long as I am the Secretary of Labor, the Department will go after anyone who negligently puts workers at risk.” 

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No Requirement to Prove Job Availability or Earning Power in "Late Requested" IRE.

On April 22, 2009, in Diehl v. WCAB (IA Constr. & Liberty Mut. Ins.) , 972 A.2d 100,  the Commonwealth Court determined that even though an employer’s request for an Impairment Rating Evaluation (IRE) was beyond the 60-day window following the expiration of 104 weeks of total disability benefits, it was still entitled to pursue a petition to modify the claimant’s benefit status from total to partial without having to prove either job availability or earning power. This decision represents a reversal of the Court’s previous ruling in this case.

In Diehl, the IRE evaluation determined that the Claimant had an impairment rating of 28% (i.e., well below the 50% impairment threshold for change of status to “partial” disability). However, the employer requested the IRE well beyond the 60-day window. Upon receipt of the IRE determination, the employer then sought to unilaterally modify the claimant’s disability status from one of total disability to partial disability. The Claimant argued that the employer could not prevail by merely proving an impairment of less than 50%, but was also required to show evidence of job availability and/or earning power. 

In its April 2008 decision, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the Claimant and indicated that employers who seek to show that a claimant is no longer temporarily totally disabled must prove their case by not only establishing an impairment rating of less than 50%, but also through vocational rehabilitation proof. Specifically, an employer cannot unilaterally shift a claimant’s benefits from TTD to PPD upon a showing of an impairment rating below 50%, but must also demonstrate job availability or restored earning power. However, in its revised decision, the Court held that “under the Act, an employer seeking to change a claimant’s benefit status using results of an IRE requested outside the 60-day window must obtain an agreement from the claimant or an adjudication that the claimant’s condition improved to an impairment rating less than 50 percent. Proof of earning power and job availability is not required.”

FMLA Leave Does Not Mean Disability for Purposes of the Rehabilitation Act

According to a decision by the Third Circuit, the simple fact that an employee receives FMLA leave does not necessarily mean that the employee is disabled for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. Further, an employee does not automatically have a “record of disability” if the FMLA leave was approved.

In an October 21, 2008 unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit held that a nurse with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and alcoholism failed to demonstrate that she had a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. In Nicholson v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, 3d Cir., No. 07-4354 (2008 WL 4636353), the Third Circuit upheld the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the West Penn Allegheny Health System.

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Third Circuit - No Breach of Public Policy in Discharge

In a recent holding, the Third Circuit reiterated Pennsylvania’s “at-will” presumption in employment by declining to expand the recognized exceptions to that principle. In Pennsylvania, an at-will employee can generally be discharged at any time, with or without a reason. However, Pennsylvania courts have in the past recognized an exception where an employee’s termination violates a “clear mandate of public policy,” but such situations have been limited to circumstances in which an employer: (1) requires an employee to commit a crime; (2) prevents an employee from complying with a statutorily imposed duty; or (3) discharges an employee when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute.

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WARNING -- Do Your Layoff Plans Comply with the WARN Act?

Unfortunately, the current economic climate has employers looking at the reality of layoffs and downsizing to weather this financial storm. When companies consider trimming their workforce to a significant degree, or plant closings to deal with tough economic realities, they often-times must also forewarn employees of these decisions. Aptly named the WARN Act, the federal Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act, in effect since 1989, requires certain employers to provide sixty-days’ advance notice of such a “mass layoff” or “plant closing.” The purpose of the WARN Act is to give affected employees sufficient advance notice to adjust to and hopefully emerge from the impending job loss.

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Agency Home Health Aides: Not Exempt From Minimum Wage and Overtime Under Pennsylvania Law

After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that home health aides employed by third parties are exempt from overtime requirements under the federal “domestic services” exemption, the question of whether these same home health aides were also exempt from Pennsylvania’s minimum wage and overtime requirements under its “domestic services” exemption still remained. On September 4, 2008, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court answered that question in the negative in a case brought by Bayada Nurses, Inc. against the Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry (“L&I”).

As background, Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”) exempts from minimum wage and overtime requirements “[d]omestic services in or about the private home of the employer.” Unlike the federal regulations, however, Pennsylvania’s regulation defines “domestic services” more narrowly as “work in or about a private dwelling for an employer in his capacity as a householder, as distinguished from work in or about a private dwelling for such employer in the employer’s pursuit of a trade, occupation, profession, enterprise or vocation.”   And unlike the federal regulations, Pennsylvania does not have a “companionship services” provision that would cover employees employed by third parties, such as Bayada’s and many other agencies’ home health aides.

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Compensation Required for Employees Receiving Treatment under OSHA Provision.

In Secretary of Labor v. Beverly Healthcare-Hillview, No. 06-4810, 2008 WL 4107489 (3rd Cir. September 4, 2008) the Court found that a nursing home operator was required to compensate employees for travel expenses and non-work time spent receiving treatment under the Bloodborne Pathogens Standard of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The Bloodborne Pathogens Standard requires that employers make the hepatitis B vaccine and other medical evaluations and treatments available to all exposed employees at no cost to the employee.

The Company at issue operated a nursing home in Pennsylvania, and two nurses who worked at the facility, received a “needlestick” while at work. Both nurses subsequently sought treatment for their wounds at an off-site medical facility. Their subsequent and ongoing treatment required them to return to that facility for periodic follow-up during non-work hours.

The Company paid for the cost of the medical evaluations and procedures, but failed to compensate the nurses for the non-work hours they spent receiving their follow-up treatments. Moreover, the Company did not compensate the employees for their travel expenses to and from the facility.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued citations to the Company for failure to compensate the nurses for travel expenses and non-work time spent receiving treatment. The Company disputed the citations, and argued that the no-cost provision of the Act should not be read so broadly. 

Subsequently, an administrative law judge upheld the citations, but the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission reversed, finding that the Company did not have “fair notice” of the broad interpretation of the no-cost provision.

Ultimately, the Third Circuit disagreed, and found that the Company had “fair notice” of the no-cost provision as a result of OSHA’s opinion letters, directives and prior caselaw. Specifically, the Court found instructive a 1999 opinion letter which stated that transportation under the Bloodborne Pathogens Standard may not need to be provided by the employer, but the employer must cover the cost of transportation. The same opinion letter also provided that when receiving a vaccine or commuting to have it administered, employees must be considered on-duty and compensated.   Accordingly, the Court agreed with the Secretary of Labor’s position that a “reasonable interpretation” of the no-cost provision required the Company to pay for travel expenses and non-work time.

Rastafarian Police Officer Ordered to Cut His Hair May Take His Claims to Trial

On July 23, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a Rastafarian police officer who refused to cut his hair may take to trial some of his claims of religious discrimination and retaliation. In Dodd v. SEPTA, 2008 WL 29202618 (E.D. Pa. July 2008) the Court partially denied the summary judgment motion of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), holding that SEPTA’s proffered reasons for disciplining and discharging the plaintiff, Niles Dodd, may be pretextual for bias against Dodd’s religion and its requirement that he maintain uncut hair.

During the course of his seven year employment with SEPTA, Dodd became a Rastafarian. However, SEPTA’s appearance policy required male officers to keep their hair under their hats. Dodd was formally disciplined on several occasions for violating the policy. Subsequently, in late 2004 and early 2005, Dodd wrote and distributed memoranda criticizing SEPTA. As a result of these memos, SEPTA conducted an investigation to determine whether Dodd violated SEPTA’s procedures for making internal complaints when he filed his memos. The investigation ultimately led to Dodd’s discharge. Dodd sued SEPTA, claiming that he was subjected to religious bias, disparate treatment, a failure to accommodate his religion, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

 

The Court found that Dodd was a member of a protected religious class, was a qualified police officer, and sustained several adverse employment actions, including an involuntary psychological test, several suspensions, and termination. In addition, the Court also found that SEPTA was aware of Dodd’s religion prior to the adverse actions and that its alleged nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Dodd, i.e., his repeated violations of the appearance policy and his violation of internal complaint procedures, may have been pretextual. The Court noted that Dodd was the only SEPTA officer ever to be disciplined for a violation of the department’s appearance standards, despite the fact that at least two other officers wore their hair below the uniform hat.

The Court also concluded that: (1) SEPTA’s appearance policy unlawfully interfered with Dodd’s religious beliefs, due to the fact that one of the tenets of Rastafarianism prohibited him from cutting his hair; (2) SEPTA failed to make good faith efforts to accommodate Dodd’s religious beliefs (e.g., letting Dodd wear a ponytail would not have caused SEPTA undue hardship); (3) Dodd’s ongoing encounters with his supervisors regarding his hair and religion were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment that had a detrimental effect on him; and (4) Dodd’s memoranda and his EEOC complaint implicated SEPTA’s nondiscrimination policy, and constituted protected activity for Title VII purposes; thereby, raising an inference of retaliation.

A Corrections Officer Who Turned a Blind Eye on an Assault Against an Inmate Is Not Entitled to Unemployment Compensation Benefits

A corrections officer has a duty to protect inmates. If he/she turns a blind eye on threatened or actual physical assaults of inmates for fear of retaliation by coworkers, the officer is not entitled to collect unemployment-compensation benefits after being fired for doing so. See Department of Corrections v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, -- A.2d --, No. 1205 D.C. 2006 (Commw. Ct. March 6, 2008).

The Lancaster Service Center and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania agree on that. The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review disagreed, though, and awarded benefits.

On the employer’s appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that the corrections officer was not entitled to benefits because the officer’s fear of retaliation was not good cause for willful misconduct. The misconduct was violating his duty to protect inmates and therefore acting contrary to the employer’s best interests and intentionally disregarding the behavior standards that the employer could expect. (If an employee proves that he/she had good cause for willful misconduct, benefits can be awarded.) As the appellate court put it:

[I]t shocks the conscience of this Court that the Board concluded that a corrections officer who refused to report a threat of violence against an inmate and refuses to render aid to an inmate being beaten could use fear for his own personal safety as good cause justification for his refusal to render aid.

The corrections officer argued that he had good cause for the violations because he feared for his own future safety if his coworkers retaliated against him for thwarting the attack engineered by a fellow corrections officer. No doubt, this is not a position anyone would want to find themselves in. However, the officer’s fear was held not to justify his disregard of what he was hired to do.

The prudent thing for the officer to do would have been to act to protect the inmate, then enlist the employer’s assistance with dealing with any retaliation by coworkers. While that option might not have been appealing to the officer from a practical perspective, his employer had to be able to rely on the officer to discharge his duty of protecting inmates. An employer entity can only act through its representatives.

This decision can apply to other workplaces as well, standing for the general proposition that an employee who willfully violates a job duty because of fear of coworkers’ retaliation must not be awarded unemployment-compensation benefits.

The U.S. Department of Labor Proposes Revisions to the Family Medical Leave Act Regulations That Permit Settlement of FMLA Claims Without Department or Court Oversight

On February 11, 2008, the United States Department of Labor (DOL) proposed new regulations regarding the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). One topic of the DOL’s many proposals is the waiver of FMLA claims. 

The FMLA contains a provision that makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with or restrain the exercise of any right protected under the FMLA. The DOL's current regulations regarding this provision state that an employer cannot “induce employees to waive their rights under the FMLA.” As we have reported previously, this language led to a debate among the courts whether employers wishing to resolve FMLA disputes could do so at all, or only with supervision from the DOL or with court approval. The federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that employers could resolve FMLA disputes already in existence through private separation or settlement agreements, but that the employer could not require employees to waive their future FMLA rights through such a settlement. Dougherty v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, No. Civ. A. 05-2336 (E.D. Pa. August 2006). In a contrary ruling, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (embracing federal courts located in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina) held that the DOL’s waiver regulations prohibited all FMLA settlements without supervision from the DOL or without court approval. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007).

The DOL’s proposed regulations, citing efficiency concerns and the public policy of promoting prompt settlements, make it clear that although employers may not enter into agreements that waive an employee’s “prospective rights under FMLA,” they can settle retrospective or existing claims in private agreements without oversight or approval from either the DOL or from a court.

You may submit comments about the proposed regulatory changes electronically at www.regulations.gov until midnight April 11, 2008. 

Third Circuit Finds Notice of Potential Need for FMLA Leave Sufficient

Pursuant to a recent decision by the Third Circuit, an employee's oral notification to his supervisor of his potential need for surgery served as sufficient notice for leave to his employer to warrant protection under the Family and Medical Leave Act. In a holding that broadens the type of conduct sufficient to put an employer on notice of an employee's need for FMLA leave, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court of New Jersey’s grant of summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff/employee's FMLA claim. Sarnowski v. Air Brook Limousine, No. 06-2144 (3d Cir. Dec. 12, 2007). (The Third Circuit has jurisdiction over Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.)

To exercise the right to FMLA leave, an eligible employee must provide his or her employer with reasonably adequate information under the circumstances to give the employer notice that the employee seeks leave under the FMLA. Generally speaking, the employee does not have to expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA. The decisive question is the manner in which the information conveyed to the employer is understood.  

In Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the award of summary judgment to the employer dismissing the employee’s FMLA interference claim. In that case, Sarnowski was terminated eight days after informing his supervisor that his doctor had advised him of the need to monitor his heart and the potential need for additional surgery and 6 weeks of leave. At the time, Sarnowski had only recently returned to work after missing 6 weeks of work due to coronary bypass surgery. The plaintiff/employee argued that the defendant/employer interfered with his rights by terminating him after he notified his supervisor of the medical monitoring and the possibility of additional heart surgery. 

In analyzing what constitutes sufficient legal notice under the FMLA, the Third Circuit emphasized that the regulations do not require an employee to submit formal written requests for leave. Furthermore, the Court found that verbal notification which raises an employer's awareness of a potential FMLA covered leave, without an employee expressly asserting its rights or making mention of the FMLA, is appropriate notice pursuant to FMLA regulations. The Third Circuit interpreted the regulations to imply that providing precise dates and duration of the leave are not necessary. 

The Court’s decision in Sarnowski certainly invites employee abuse of the FMLA. Permitting employees to request leave even though they don't know if or when it may start burdens significantly an employer. In light of this decision, it is important for employers to train their human resources employees to recognize and respond to ambiguous employee statements about the potential need for leave.

U.S. Supreme Court Likely to Weigh In On the Question "Whether Employees Can Agree to Settle Employment Claims Under the Family Medical Leave Act"

For the past two years, the answer to this question has been in a state of flux in Pennsylvania. In August 2006, the federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania answered this question in the negative, and allowed an employee’s Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claim against her employer to go to trial, despite a severance agreement and release waiving any claim arising from or relating in any way to her employment. Dougherty v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, No. Civ. A. 05-2336 (E.D. Pa. August 2006). 

Then, eight months later in April 2007, that court reconsidered its decision and reversed itself, ruling that, yes, employers can settle FMLA claims brought by employees. Specifically, the court concluded that the FMLA regulations do not prevent an employee from waiving and/or settling any claims for past violations of the FMLA as part of a severance or settlement agreement. This ruling was supported by the United States Department of Labor (DOL), which has historically encouraged the settlement of such claims. 

Three months later, a divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals answered the question in the negative for employers in Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Maryland: absent prior court or DOL approval, the FMLA regulations bar all waivers or releases of employees’ FMLA rights, including the right to bring a claim for a past violation of the FMLA. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) . This decision would open the floodgates for employers to submit separation and severance agreements for DOL review, and settlement agreements to the court for approval, unnecessarily injecting the DOL and courts into what had heretofore been private negotiations between employers and employees.

To possibly settle this unsettled issue, the Supreme Court on January 14, 2008 asked the Solicitor General to weigh-in on whether the Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. decision was correct. Given the DOL’s position permitting the waiver of FMLA claims, the Solicitor General may recommend that the Supreme Court take on the issue and grant certiorari. Keep in mind that the Solicitor General serves as an advocate for government agencies, and the Supreme Court usually follows the Solicitor General’s recommendation.

Although the answer to the question may be far from certain, the import of these decisions for employers is clear. Employers need to exercise caution when drafting separation, severance, and settlement agreements that contain broadly-worded releases. The agreement should specify the statutes for which a waiver or release of claims is sought, and should include a severability clause that would save the otherwise enforceable provisions of the agreement. If the location of the employment relationship, or the law governing the agreement, lies in the Fourth Circuit, however, any waiver or release of FMLA claims is not valid without court or DOL approval, at least until the Supreme Court weighs in on this issue.

We haven’t heard the latest on this question, and I will keep you updated as the issue develops

Students (and Employees): Hack at Your Own Risk

A school board expelled a tenth-grade student for the remainder of the semester after he admitted helping another student hack into the school’s computer system. In M.T. for A.T. v. Central York School District, the decision was upheld by a York County judge and, on November 5, 2007, by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

This was not the first time the student violated the school’s computer use policy. He previously was suspended for making fake student ID cards. This time, he admittedly decoded encrypted information, obtained passwords that he was not supposed to have, used an administrative password to install software that enabled access from the Internet, and had access to several teachers’ accounts. Given the escalating nature of the offense, the appellate court found that the punishment was appropriate and, indeed, needed to get the student’s attention.

To justify the expulsion, the school board relied on its Student Code, including the Computer Use Policy, which parents and students receive through a Student Planner. The student had signed a copy of the Policy. At the hearing, the student did not testify, but his mother did, and she admitted that her son probably knew he should not have done what he did. The student argued on appeal, though, that he should only have been suspended, per the policy. The courts agreed with the school board that the policy had only a suggestion of suspension as a penalty, while the appendix to the Code stated that such a penalty was merely a guide. Therefore, the school board acted within its discretion, and consistent with its policy, when it expelled the student for what it considered to be a serious breach. The principal testified that security of its computer system is more important than ever because the school had moved to a paperless system.

This case has implications for employers as well as for schools. The legal analysis of the Code was consistent with how courts analyze employee handbooks with respect to employee misconduct and ramifications. Essentially, a contract analysis was applied to interpret the Code. Also, it indicates that schools (and employers) will be given latitude to protect themselves from hackers.

Yet another reason why employers shouldn't stereotype

Yet another reason why employers shouldn’t stereotype . . .

 

Employees who balance the demands of caring for a family with the pressures of paid work have always had a difficult time.  Now, those employees may be receiving a little help from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  On May 23, 2007, the EEOC issued new and extensive enforcement guidelines regarding employers’ treatment of their “caregiving” employees.  Specifically, the guidelines address the growing problem of employees who have family responsibilities, and/or who must care for a family member, being subjected to disparate treatment.  As a preamble, the guidelines state:

 

Although the federal EEO laws do not prohibit discrimination against caregivers per se, there are circumstances in which discrimination against caregivers might constitute unlawful disparate treatment. The purpose of this document is to assist investigators, employees, and employers in assessing whether a particular employment decision affecting a caregiver might unlawfully discriminate on the basis of prohibited characteristics under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

 

At its most relevant, the guidelines state that employers who perceive an employee with caregiving responsibilities as unable to perform the same amount of work, or the same caliber of work, as its other employees may violate federal anti-discrimination laws.  This perception, or stereotype, on the part of the employer means family caregivers are provided with less career options and less chances for career advancement than other employees.  The guidelines state:

 

Individuals with caregiving responsibilities also may encounter the maternal wall through employer stereotyping. Writing for the Supreme Court in 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that “the faultline between work and family [is] precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.”  Sex-based stereotyping about caregiving responsibilities is not limited to childcare and includes other forms of caregiving, such as care of a sick parent or spouse.  Thus, women with caregiving responsibilities may be perceived as more committed to caregiving than to their jobs and as less competent than other workers, regardless of how their caregiving responsibilities actually impact their work.  Male caregivers may face the mirror image stereotype: that men are poorly suited to caregiving.  As a result, men may be denied parental leave or other benefits routinely afforded their female counterparts. . . Employment decisions based on such stereotypes violate the federal antidiscrimination statutes, even when an employer acts upon such stereotypes unconsciously or reflexively.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they match the stereotype associated with their group.”  Thus, for example, employment decisions based on stereotypes about working mothers are unlawful because “the antidiscrimination laws entitle individuals to be evaluated as individuals rather than as members of groups having certain average characteristics.”

 

Given these guidelines, employers must be all the more vigilant and refrain from making employment decisions based upon stereotypes of the employee’s family responsibilities.       

The First Amendment Has Its Limits.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued a decision that draws a line in the sand for purposes of the First Amendment.   Montanye v. Wissahickon School District, 2007 WL 541710 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 2007).  The court makes clear that the First Amendment does not cloak all conduct with protection.  Not every action is constitutionally protected just because someone intends to express an idea.  An effort to convey a particular message must be proven and the likelihood that others would understand the message must be great.

Montanye was a ninth-grade teacher who was concerned about the mental health of one of her students.  When the student expressed suicidal thoughts, Montanye shared her concern with the student's mother and even attended some therapist sessions with the student (with the permission of the student and her mother because the student would only go if her teacher accompanied her).

The school district, upon learning about this, was worried about the propriety of the Montanye's interactions with the student.  After a hearing, it issued a letter, which the teacher said was a "constructive discharge letter."  Among other things, it instructed Montanye that, if she "engages in any conduct outside the school or outside her status of a teacher with any student or parent, she is to notify the school and advise the parent that she is doing so strictly in her personal capacity."

Montanye filed a lawsuit, claiming that her right to expressive conduct under the First Amendment was violated and that the federal Rehabilitation Act was violated.  She alleged that what she did amounted to protected speech and that the school wanted to chill her speech and punish her for assisting special education students.

The federal trial court dismissed her claims, and the appellate federal court affirmed.  Both claims were dismissed for the same reason.  That is, while Montanye's actions might have involved a "kernel of expression", her actions in assisting the student were not "expressive or communicative."   Montanye argued that her speech and conduct was constitutionally protected because it concerned a matter of great public importance in that she was helping the student achieve a healthy life and giving her educational and emotional support.  But the court rejected the argument, explaining that it was insufficient to convey a particularized message or to be understood as conveying such a message.

This case is a victory for schools (and employers, generally), which might have some trepidation about taking action they believe to be best for fear of treading upon First Amendment rights.  However, practically speaking, how it will play out in the halls of our schools remains to be seen.

Skip Meals and Profit

A California wage statute requires employers to give employees an extra hour's pay on any day that the employee misses a required meal or break period.  In other words, miss a fifteen-minute break, get an hour's pay.   In Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions Inc., the court was asked whether the extra hour's pay was intended as compensation for employees or as a penalty for employers.  In the first case, a three-year statute of limitations would apply to claims for the extra hour's pay.  In the latter, claims would be subject to the stricter one-year statute. 

Because the extra hour of pay is awarded with no reference to the actual amount of meal/break time an employee lost, one might think the award was intended to penalize employers for failure to comply with the statutory meal/break times.  One would be wrong.  The statute, according to the California Supreme Court, is all about compensating employees.  Claims for the extra hour's pay therefore survive for three years.  California employers are not amused:

Robert Tollen, who represented the defendant, Kenneth Cole Productions Inc., said the ruling could "easily" cost companies millions of dollars. Especially, he said, because of an ever-increasing number of wage-and-hour class actions in California.

"It's going to cost a lot of money," he said, "in a situation where there's not a significant degree of wrongdoing."

Although the case is thousands of miles from Pennsylvania, the moral of the story hits home:  businesses need to be mindful of compliance issues in all aspects of their operations.  As Kenneth Cole demonstrates, the cost of non-compliance with even the most trivial of regulations can be substantial.

Privacy in the Cubicles

On March 2, the Court of Common Pleas for Monroe County issued a decision dismissing, on Preliminary Objections, an employment-related privacy case for failure to state a claim.  In Adamski v. Johnson, 80 D. & C. 4th 69, an employee sued her employer for invasion of privacy.  In a nutshell, the employee was going to have a surgery but, when her employer asked what type, the employee refused to answer.  Curiosity having been aroused, the employer allegedly "asked [employee's] fellow workers what surgery she was scheduled to receive, 'using the power of the employment relationship to force, coerce and intimidate' the[] employees to disclose [the] information."  The employee further alleged that, not only did the employer learn the concealed information, he also discussed it with others.  Of all the nerve, right? 

Naturally, litigation ensued. Continue Reading...

Identity Theft for HR Professionals

This afternoon, I delivered a presentation (pdf warning) to the York Society of Human Resources Managers on the subject of identity theft.  Now, everyone understands identity theft from the perspective of a consumer, i.e., the poor sap whose identity is stolen, but identity theft from the perspective of an HR professional is, as I found out, a rather different kettle of fish. 

Credit: Dave Pilibosian The presentation discusses two recent Pennsylvania laws that bear on identity theft as well as the federal "shredder law," all of which place obligations on businesses that maintain confidential/personal information, whether for customers or employees.  In addition, the presentation considers a relatively recent negligence case (pdf warning) out of Michigan as a cautionary tale for Pennsylvania businesses that don't take sufficient precautions to guard employees' confidential/personal information.  Although the law elucidated in the Michigan case is not yet the law of Pennsylvania, I suspect it may be if and when such a case percolates through the courts.  The very bottom line?  Businesses should stop using employee social security numbers for any purpose not strictly necessary.  If you can accomplish that, you've halfway cracked the nut.

Over at their joint blog, Becker and Posner bring a law-and-economics approach to bear on the issue of deterring ID Theft   Although the discussion is from last September, it remains interesting stuff.  Really, though, how could it not?