Pennsylvania Litigation Blog : Pennsylvania Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : Barley Snyder Law Firm : Serving Lancaster, Reading, York, Chambersburg

On July 23, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a Rastafarian police officer who refused to cut his hair may take to trial some of his claims of religious discrimination and retaliation. In Dodd v. SEPTA, 2008 WL 29202618 (E.D. Pa. July 2008) the Court partially denied the summary judgment motion of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), holding that SEPTA’s proffered reasons for disciplining and discharging the plaintiff, Niles Dodd, may be pretextual for bias against Dodd’s religion and its requirement that he maintain uncut hair.

During the course of his seven year employment with SEPTA, Dodd became a Rastafarian. However, SEPTA’s appearance policy required male officers to keep their hair under their hats. Dodd was formally disciplined on several occasions for violating the policy. Subsequently, in late 2004 and early 2005, Dodd wrote and distributed memoranda criticizing SEPTA. As a result of these memos, SEPTA conducted an investigation to determine whether Dodd violated SEPTA’s procedures for making internal complaints when he filed his memos. The investigation ultimately led to Dodd’s discharge. Dodd sued SEPTA, claiming that he was subjected to religious bias, disparate treatment, a failure to accommodate his religion, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

The Court found that Dodd was a member of a protected religious class, was a qualified police officer, and sustained several adverse employment actions, including an involuntary psychological test, several suspensions, and termination. In addition, the Court also found that SEPTA was aware of Dodd’s religion prior to the adverse actions and that its alleged nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Dodd, i.e., his repeated violations of the appearance policy and his violation of internal complaint procedures, may have been pretextual. The Court noted that Dodd was the only SEPTA officer ever to be disciplined for a violation of the department’s appearance standards, despite the fact that at least two other officers wore their hair below the uniform hat.

The Court also concluded that: (1) SEPTA’s appearance policy unlawfully interfered with Dodd’s religious beliefs, due to the fact that one of the tenets of Rastafarianism prohibited him from cutting his hair; (2) SEPTA failed to make good faith efforts to accommodate Dodd’s religious beliefs (e.g., letting Dodd wear a ponytail would not have caused SEPTA undue hardship); (3) Dodd’s ongoing encounters with his supervisors regarding his hair and religion were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment that had a detrimental effect on him; and (4) Dodd’s memoranda and his EEOC complaint implicated SEPTA’s nondiscrimination policy, and constituted protected activity for Title VII purposes; thereby, raising an inference of retaliation.

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has drawn considerable attention recently in the Third Circuit.

Under the traditional application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts (such as district and bankruptcy courts) are prohibited from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. In other words, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over actions which have already been litigated in state court, or which are deemed "inextricably intertwined" with a previous state court adjudication. A matter is "inextricably intertwined" where the desired federal relief would require either (1) a determination that the state court was wrong; or (2) action by the federal court that would render the state court’s judgment ineffectual (i.e.: would allow the federal plaintiff to undo or prevent enforcement of the state court’s order).

However, in Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indust., Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) slip op here, the Supreme Court seemed to limit the scope of Rooker-Feldman by specifying that the doctrine applies only when the loser of a state court action asks the federal court to review and reject the state court judgments. Stated differently, the "doctrine applies only when a plaintiff asks a district court to redress an injury caused by the state court judgment itself-not when a plaintiff merely seeks to relitigate a claim or issue already litigated in state court." Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 2008 WL 1813161 (3d Cir. 2008) slip op here.

In the wake of Exxon, Third Circuit courts have been quick to re-affirm their adherence to the Rooker-Feldman paradigm, while simply invoking the doctrine of Res judicata, or claim preclusion, whenever the Exxon limitation may be implicated. In effect, it may be rather difficult to discern claims which are barred by these respective doctrines. Indeed, some recent opinions simply cite the doctrines as alternative rationales for dismissing the same claim. Technically, however, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal claim to the extent it seeks to undo or prevent execution of a state court judgment, whereas Res judicata bars a claim to the extent that it seeks to adjudicate all or part of a claim which was, or even could have been, adjudicated in a previous litigation.

It is further worth noting in this context that the Third Circuit has left the door open for Rule 11 sanctions to be imposed upon a plaintiff who persists in pursuit of a federal claim, even after receiving notice that said claim appears to be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2008) slip op here.

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 In the case N&L Coal Co. v. DEP (case number 2008097 docket available) , N&L appealed an order issued by DEP.   N&L was operating a coal mine on property leased by the City of Philadelphia, Girard Estate. The City sent a letter to DEP alleging that N&L’s lease expired and that the City no longer wanted N&L mining the property. In response to the City’s letter DEP issued an order directing N&L to cease mining and to reclaim the site. 

N&L appealed the order and filed a petition for supersedeas. N&L also filed a declaratory judgment action in Philadelphia Orphan’s Court relative to the lease dispute, Stephen Girard, Deceased (case ID 10DE-1885) search by docket number. The parties met several times in an effort to resolve the dispute. On the eve of the supersedeas hearing, DEP entered into a Consent Order and Agreement whereby it withdrew the order and allowed N&L to resume mining. In rescinding the order, DEP indicated that the pending civil action was the proper forum to address the property dispute and that DEP should not properly enter into such disputes.

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In the case, Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Game Commission, 950 A.2d 1120, slip op available  (Pa. Commw. 2008) the Commonwealth Court denied the Pennsylvania Game Commission’s (“PGC”) preliminary objections relative to a petition for declaratory judgment filed by the Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania (“Unified”). Unified alleged in its petition that the PGC abused its discretion with regard to the number and allocation of antlerless deer license it issued for 2007-2008 and also that PGC failed to properly implement the “DMAP” program which allows landowners to apply for additional permits to provide for the taking of additional antlerless deer on their property. 

The PGC filed preliminary objections challenging the sufficiency of Unified’s petition. PGC’s arguments revolved around previous litigation filed by Unified, which litigation had previously been dismissed by the Commonwealth Court. In denying PGC’s preliminary objections, the Court indicated that Unified’s petition adequately addressed the Court’s jurisdiction, the legal challenge to the PGC’s actions and Unified’s standing to bring the action.

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Our Supreme Court reminded us recently of the pitfalls of joint inter vivos trusts, particularly where revocation is concerned. Scalfaro v. Rudloff, 934 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2007) slip op (http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-31-2007mo.pdf). Consider the case of parents who place their home in a revocable inter vivos trust, naming their 3 adult children as beneficiaries. Mom dies; Dad revokes the trust and then deeds the property to 2 of the 3 children.

In a 5-2 decision reversing the Superior Court 884 A.2d 904, slip opinion available (http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/superior/out/a10018_05.pdf ), the Supreme Court (per retiring Justice Cappy) dissected the terms of the joint inter vivos trust document and upheld the trial court’s decision that Dad had no power to revoke the trust. While the opinion focused on the exact language of the “form-book” deed of trust, are the implications more far reaching?

The dissent slip op available (http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-31-2007do.pdf ) was penned by Justice Saylor and joined by Justice Eakin. Justice Saylor found the form-book deed of trust (that was executed without the benefit of counsel) to be “poorly drafted and materially ambiguous.” Justice Saylor would have focused on Mom and Dad’s intent.

Both the majority and dissent engage in an interesting discussion of document interpretation that will be of benefit to (or haunt) many of us who practice in this area. Pennsylvania’s new Uniform Trust Act doesn’t completely resolve the issue. 20 Pa. C.S.A. §7752(b) which addresses revocation of joint trusts doesn’t address the situation where one settlor/spouse dies and hence cannot notify the other spouse.

Practitioners should note that, like the Weidner case, Scalfaro is another instance where the Supreme Court differed sharply from the Superior Court in the area of trusts and estates. Both cases involved a pre-printed, “form book” document.

A burning question remains - will the two siblings who lost the property sue the form-book company??

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Pennsylvania and federal laws provide heightened confidentiality to an individual’s mental-health records. The confidentiality is heightened as compared to other medical records. This represents an important public-health policy embraced by the state and federal legislatures.

When a party to a lawsuit seeks mental-health records from another party or from a non-party, difficult issues arise. State and federal statutes, such as HIPAA and Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), and corresponding regulations must be analyzed carefully. The threshold inquiry is whether an entity that has the records falls within the reach of the confidentiality laws. For example, is an entity that has records containing an individual’s mental-health information a “facility” as defined in the MHPA? The answer is not always clear. In that event, it often is prudent for the entity to err on the side of caution and provide heightened confidentiality as required by the law. The Act prohibits a covered facility from disclosing covered information. So an entity exposes itself to greater risk if it does not comply with the law, then later finds out that a court believes it was supposed to comply.

This issue is not novel. It recently came up in a case that was appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc., a defendant was a school for children with mental and behavioral issues. The lawsuit alleged that a student was sexually assaulted by a school counselor. In discovery, the student sought information about instances of sexual assault involving other students. The school opposed the requests, arguing that mental-health information could not be released based on the MHPA, HIPAA, and other laws. The trial court issued two discovery orders requiring disclosure but with identifying information redacted. The school appealed the orders. The appellate court vacated the orders and remanded for the trial court’s further consideration on a number of grounds. One of the considerations for the trial court was if the school was a “facility” under the MHPA. If so, and if the trial court also decided that the documents that the student wanted contained mental-health treatment information, then the trial court had to amend its initial discovery orders to provide even further protections.

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