A Guide for Brew Pub Entrepreneurs

Throughout Pennsylvania, the emergence of brew pubs are making Pennsylvania beer lovers very happy. In many instances, these brew pubs are helping revitalize downtown areas and redevelop older buildings, providing a boost to local economies. Brew pubs are allowed to brew their own individually crafted beers and sell them to their customers along with food and Pennsylvania wines. Some of the brew pubs have been opened by existing breweries to provide their beer directly to consumers, while others have found them to be a great boost to existing restaurants. This has created a nice buzz in local communities where beer lovers can find a variety of beers brewed not in Colorado or Missouri, but right here in Pennsylvania.

Just as with the sale of any alcohol in Pennsylvania, brew pubs are regulated by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB). In order to manufacture and sell the beer directly to customers, two licenses are required. The first is a license for manufacture, storage or transportation (a brewery license) which allows the applicant to brew the beer. The second is a retail liquor or retail dispenser license which allows the applicant to sell the beer directly to consumers. 

In addition to the state licenses, brew pubs also require approval from the Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) within the federal government. TTB regulates the brewing of beer for purposes other than personal or family use. In order to obtain approval from TTB, a Brewer’s Notice must be obtained. The federal government taxes the sale of beer by brewers, so a tax tank must be obtained and used as part of the brewer’s operations.

In addition to federal and state licenses, brew pubs require zoning approval from local municipalities, which can sometimes be difficult as most zoning ordinances do not specifically define brew pubs, or even breweries, as a specific use. Barley Snyder has assisted brewers with securing zoning approval and the applicable licenses to begin their operations. Brewers interested in learning more about the process, or seeking assistance with their applications, should contact Jeremy Frey at 717-852-4983 or jfrey@barley.com to discuss.
 

Employers May Be Eligible for Refund of Severance Pay FICA Taxes

Employers who have made severance payments to laid off employees may be entitled to refunds of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes remitted in connection with such payments.  According to a ruling from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, finalized just last month, severance payments qualifying as supplemental unemployment compensation benefit (“SUB”) payments are not taxable as wages, and accordingly, are not subject to FICA taxes.  The Internal Revenue Code defines SUB payments as (1) payments made to an employee, (2) pursuant to an employer’s plan, (3) because of an employee’s involuntary separation from employment, whether temporary or permanent, (4) resulting directly from a reduction in force, the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar conditions, and (5) included in the employee’s gross income.

If your company’s severance payments satisfy this definition, consult your tax advisor promptly to explore preserving potential refund claims.  A company can file a protective tax refund claim for any taxable year that remains open.  Typically, a taxable year remains open until three years after the date the return was due or two years after the payment date, whichever is later.  As a result, an employer’s 2009 income tax return (assuming such employer reports on a calendar year) will typically remain open until April 14, 2013.

To obtain refunds of SUB payments, employers must secure each terminated employee’s written consent to file the refund claim for FICA taxes withheld on the employee’s behalf.  Additionally, employers must pay employees their share of any refunded FICA taxes.

For employers with operations within the Sixth Circuit’s geographic area (Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee), their refund claims for SUB payments may be processed now.  All others, including employers operating in Pennsylvania, will have to wait and see how the issues resolve.  The Government has until April 4, 2013 to appeal the issue to the United States Supreme Court, and Congress could amend the Internal Revenue Code to clarify the definition of SUB payments.  But if the Sixth Circuit’s decision is not overturned or amended, it could be extended throughout the country.

Despite the uncertainty, this is an area with potentially significant financial implications for employers who have been forced to lay off employees over the last several years.  Such employers should decide soon whether to file refund claims to avoid missing out on the potential financial benefit if the Sixth Circuit’s decision stands or is extended to other areas of the country.   

When Retirement Isn't Really Retirement: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds Early Retirees Eligible for Unemployment Compensation Benefits

In  Diehl v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently ruled that early retirees are eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, reversing over 30 years of case law on the subject. In this case, Howard Diehl, a 63 year-old shipping clerk, accepted an early retirement package his employer offered as part of a program to avoid layoffs. The package included continuation of health insurance benefits and payment of unused vacation leave. Subsequently, Diehl filed for unemployment compensation benefits, but his claim was denied because Diehl voluntarily resigned without a necessitous and compelling reason. The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and the Commonwealth Court upheld the denial.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Unemployment Compensation Law’s definition of “layoff” could be interpreted to include the voluntary acceptance of an early retirement package. Consequently, employers considering early retirement programs should now factor in the costs of unemployment compensation claims. Employers can no longer defend claims by early retirees on the basis that they voluntarily left employment.

Barley Snyder’s Employment Law Group frequently counsels employers on early retirement programs and incentives. Please contact a member of our Employment Law Group if you would like assistance in structuring legally compliant retirement programs and incentives.

U.S. Department of Labor Issues Final Regulations Regarding FMLA's Qualifying Exigency and Military Caregiver Provisions

On February 5, 2013, the United States Department of Labor issued final regulations implementing amendments to the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  These amendments, passed by Congress in 2008 and 2010, created—and then expanded—two classes of military-related FMLA leave: “Qualifying Exigency Leave,” and “Military Caregiver Leave.”  Below is a list of the new regulations’ highlights:

Qualifying Exigency Leave

  • The definition of a “qualifying exigency” now includes service in the regular armed forces, as well as service in the National Guard or Reserves.  To trigger Qualifying Exigency Leave, however, service must involve deployment to a foreign country.
  • The regulations add a new leave-triggering “qualifying exigency” for employees who must care for the parent of a military member on overseas deployment.
  • The regulations also expand, from five to 15 days, the amount of time an employee may take to spend with a covered military member who is on rest-and-recuperation leave.  Employers, however, may require that employees provide a copy of the military service member’s leave orders, or other similar documentation, to certify the leave.

Military Caregiver Leave

  • Employees are now permitted to take FMLA leave to care for a veteran discharged from service (other than dishonorably) during the five-year period prior to the leave. The period between October 28, 2009 and March 8, 2013 must not be counted toward the five-year limit, which means that, currently, leave may be taken to care for veterans discharged since approximately October 2003. 
  • Leave may be taken to care for a covered service member/veteran whose serious health condition arose either before or after military service, if (1) military service aggravated the injury or illness, (2) the service member/veteran has received a 50% or greater VA Service Related Disability Rating, (3) the physical or mental condition impairs the service member/veteran’s ability to secure or maintain employment, or (4) the service member/veteran has been enrolled in the Department of Veterans Affairs Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers. 
  • Previously, only certain health care providers associated with the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) could certify the need for service member caregiver leave.  Now, any FMLA-qualified health care provider can fill out the certification form. 
  • In lieu of providing the FMLA certification form, an employee may now provide documentation establishing his/her enrollment in the VA’s Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers.  Such documentation is sufficient even if the employee is not the caregiver named in the document, although the employer may require confirmation of the employee’s relationship to the covered service member or documentation of the veteran’s discharge date and status.

The final regulations become effective March 8, 2013.  Employers should update their FMLA policies now to reflect these regulatory changes, and start using the new FMLA certification forms found at http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/index.htm#Forms.  Should you have questions about FMLA compliance, please feel free to contact any of Barley Snyder’s Employment Law Group attorneys.

Preparing for the Stepped Up CLERY ACT Enforcement

The United States Department of Education (DOE), after years of inactivity, has made it a priority to increase enforcement efforts under the CLERY Act. As a result, the DOE is conducting audits of CLERY Act compliance on a regular basis. This is a good time to revisit CLERY Act compliance and assure that your college has proper procedures in place and documents available to bring an audit to a successful outcome.

There are essentially three requirements of the CLERY Act. First, that a college notify the campus community of its current policies regarding reporting criminal actions or emergencies on campus, security of and access to campus facilities, and campus law enforcement. Second, colleges are required to have certain records and reports. Crimes must be reported to campus security authorities, reports from other law enforcement agencies must be obtained, and for colleges with campus police or security, a daily crime log must be maintained which must include non-CLERY Act crimes. Third, information must be provided to the campus. This includes timely warning of a crime that may threaten students or employees, access to the crime log, an annual security report regarding designated CLERY Act crimes, and information about obtaining data on registered sex offenders.

A college must also designate “Campus Security Authorities” (“CSA”), who are officials of an institution who have significant responsibility for student and campus activities, including, but not limited to, student housing, student discipline, and campus judicial proceedings. Each CSA is a mandated reporter of crimes and should be trained on CLERY Act compliance.

In order to be prepared for an audit, the College should have a list of all CSAs for CLERY Act purposes. Other relevant documents will include handbooks which contain institutional policies, any publications relating to the CLERY Act and information on how they are distributed, public safety operating procedures, all records of recorded crimes, both CLERY and non-CLERY, maps and lists of buildings and land for which reporting is required, and the most recent campus security reports.

It is imperative that a college enter an audit understanding the geographic area for which it must report crimes, and the crime statistics it must collect, including statistics from other law enforcement agencies. Emergency response and evacuation procedures must be in place. The daily crime logs and annual security reports must be accurate and up to date and must address procedures to report crimes or emergencies and policies and procedures for issuing timely warnings to the campus population. Any audit will also include an examination of drug or alcohol abuse education programs and programs offered by the college regarding sexual assaults and prevention of sexual offenses, including procedures to follow when a sex offense occurs.

We strongly suggest that each college create checklists of
required documents and procedures to meet complex CLERY Act requirements, and identify and train campus security authorities to meet their obligations. It has become apparent that the days of DOE indifference to CLERY Act compliance are over.

For more Higher Education articles, check out our recent Higher Education Newsletter release.

Employment Client Alert: Fair Credit Reporting Act Notice Changes to be Implemented Shortly

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has promulgated revisions to various forms required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in the context of background checks.  A creation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB is taking over responsibility for the FCRA from the Federal Trade Commission, and the new forms reflect the agency’s contact and website information.  The regulations require the new forms to be used beginning January 1, 2013.   

The FCRA is triggered any time a background check is conducted by a third-party agency.  Employers conducting background checks in conjunction with the hiring process must ensure that applicants consent to the background check in an acknowledgment form solely dedicated to that purpose.  If information in the background check might disqualify the applicant, the applicant must be notified of his or rights to dispute or explain information from the background report. The new form for this is available here at Appendix K. Additional language is required in the unusual event that a credit score would be used in a hiring decision.
 

Please feel free to contact an attorney in the Employment Law Group for further guidance regarding your obligations when conducting a background check for hiring purposes.

 

 Josh is an associate in the firm's Employment Law Group, where he represents management and employers in all aspects of labor and employment law and in employment litigation matters before federal and state courts and administrative agencies, including the Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the unemployment and workers' compensation agencies of various states.  Josh also counsels employers on issues related to employee discipline and termination, workplace harassment, and compliance with federal and state employment laws.

Click here to read Josh's full bio...

2011-2012 U.S. Supreme Court Update: A Relatively Calm Term

During its 2011-2012 term, the United States Supreme Court issued momentous decisions regarding health care, immigration, and the death penalty.  But the 2011-2012 term featured few significant labor and employment law cases, although those cases with likely long-term impact were all favorable to employers. 

Perhaps the most important decision occurred in the case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, in which the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, that a ministerial exception shields religious employers from discrimination lawsuits brought by their ministers.  In that case, a teacher at the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical School alleged that the Church terminated her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The Church moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing the teacher was a member of the Evangelical Lutheran clergy and, therefore, allowing her to sue the Church would violate the First Amendment’s prohibition on government regulation of religious activities.  The Supreme Court sided with the Church, dismissed the case, and affirmed that there is a “ministerial exception” to Federal anti-discrimination laws.  The Court also rejected the teacher’s argument that she was not really a minister because her duties primarily involved teaching secular subjects.  Instead, the Court noted that the Church classified the teacher as “called,” which meant that she had to receive a Lutheran post-secondary education, take a number of courses in theology, and obtain the endorsement of the local Snyod district.  Additionally, the teacher taught a religion class, led the students in daily prayer and devotional exercises, and led school-wide chapel service twice a year.  Given these obviously religious duties, the Court deferred to the Church’s classification of the teacher as a minister, which marks a major victory for religious institutions.  Although the case does not provide a blanket immunity from all Federal anti-discrimination laws, it does provide an immunity for those institutions when they are sued by employees whom the institutions classify as ministers.  Moreover, Federal courts will follow a religious institution’s classifications regarding which Church employees are ministers, provided some factual basis supports those classifications. 

In the case of Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the “outside sales exemption” to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Federal law that requires employers to pay an overtime wage premium when employees work more than 40 hours in a week.  As most employers know, the FLSA exempts several classes of employees from its requirements, including any employee considered an “outside salesman,” which the FLSA defines as “any employee . . . whose primary duty is . . . making sales. . . .”  Christopher worked for SmithKline Beecham as a “pharmaceutical detailer,” providing information to physicians about the company’s products with the goal of getting physicians to sign non-binding agreements to prescribe these products.  Christopher regularly worked 60 hours per week, but received no overtime pay because SmithKline Beecham classified him as an “outside salesman.”  Christopher sued for unpaid overtime, arguing that the outside sales exemption was inappropriate because his duties did not actually involve making sales, even though his duties were designed to lead to sales.  Despite never initiating any enforcement actions regarding pharmaceutical detailers, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) sided with Christopher, arguing that his duties were merely promotional and did not involve making sales.  The Court, however, rejected the DOL’s argument, holding Christopher was an “outside salesman” based on the FLSA’s broad definition of the term “sales.”  Moreover, the Court refused to give deference to the DOL’s narrow interpretation of the exemption since that interpretation was not memorialized in any formal DOL regulation.  This suggests that the Court might take a more active role in policing regulatory agencies, which could bode well for employer-sponsored challenges to agency requirements regarding “quickie elections,” obligatory posters describing collective bargaining rights, and revised “persuader” reporting requirements. 

Finally, in a case of significant importance to public employers, the Court held in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars certain claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  This immunity, though, only applies to suits filed against state-operated or state-affiliated employers and only affects the FMLA’s “self-care” and “family care” provisions.  That is, the entire FMLA still applies to non-state affiliated employers who have over 50 employees, and the FMLA’s pregnancy and family care  provisions apply to all FMLA employers, even state-operated or affiliated entities. 

Although the 2011-2012 term yielded no major labor or employment law decisions,   But in 2012-2013, the Supreme Court will have a rather active labor and employment docket in 2012-2013.  Vance v. Ball State University will address employer responsibility for harassment by employees who have some supervisory authority but lack the power to hire, discipline, or terminate other employees.  Employers who use “leads” or other similar quasi-supervisory employees will want to look out for that decision.  In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the Court will address whether employers can defeat an FLSA collective action simply by offering full relief to the named plaintiff.  And in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen, the Court will decide whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act permits judges to override specific plan language in the interest of fairness to plan participants. Stay tuned to the Employment Law Newsletter and check your email inbox for Legal Alerts; we will continue to update you as major developments occur.

Services Spotlight

Employment Litigation Management Services

Barley Snyder’s employment attorneys also work with our clients to manage and oversee litigation that may involve the use of local counsel in various states or nationwide. Our firm currently acts as employment counsel for a number of nationwide businesses covering a variety of industries, including, but not limited to, retail and manufacturing. Barley Snyder’s litigation management services are ideal for companies that operate in a multi-state or national arena but do not have the in-house capability to manage such litigation.

In this litigation management role, Barley Snyder’s employment attorneys operate as a gatekeeper for employment litigation, both at the administrative level and in state and federal court. When a company receives notice that a charge or complaint has been filed, the company forwards the matter to one of our gatekeeper lawyers. The lawyer in turn will review the matter, determine assignment of local counsel, if necessary, and monitor and oversee the handling of the matter by local counsel, or, depending on the jurisdiction where the charge or lawsuit is filed, Barley Snyder itself may be able to handle the matter. Our lawyers will also monitor the costs of the litigation and supply a client with a detailed budget regarding the services to be provided.

Barley Snyder offers its litigation management services at reduced rates. As part of this service, Barley Snyder also will provide a monthly status report for each state in which your company operates. Contact Jennifer Craighead for more information about these services - jcraighead@barley.com or 717-399-1523. 
 

David Freedman is an experienced labor and employment litigator who     represents public and private employers of all types and sizes in litigation before state and federal courts and administrative agencies. David has represented employers in claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Combined Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the Pennsylvania Wage Payment Collection Law and the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, among others.         

Click here for David's full biography...

Appeals Court Rules that Prior Oral Agreement Requires Employer to Recognize Union Through Authorization Cards

On October 16, the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision highlighting the danger of entering into oral agreements with labor unions. In the case of Rite Aid of New Jersey v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1360, the court upheld an arbitrator’s award requiring Rite Aid to recognize and bargain with a union at any store where the union obtains majority support through authorization cards. Relying upon an oral agreement made many years earlier, the court rejected Rite Aid’s request for an election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).
 
In their first collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), which ran from 1999 through 2002, Rite Aid and the Union agreed the Union could become a bargaining representative of employees in other stores through an NLRB-conducted election or “other demonstration of union status acceptable to” Rite Aid. Other evidence suggested Rite Aid orally agreed, in connection with the signing of the original CBA, that it would honor card check as the method of showing union majority status, rather than require an NLRB election.
 
Over several years, Rite Aid recognized the Union via card check on 63 occasions. After executing a later CBA, Rite Aid determined that card check was not an acceptable method of proving union majority status and began insisting on NLRB elections. The Union filed a grievance, and the arbitrator ruled that Rite Aid’s oral agreement from years earlier bound it. On appeal, the court held that, through the oral agreement, Rite Aid waived the right to reject card check status. The court also noted that Rite Aid received a benefit through the oral agreement because the Union’s Health and Welfare Plan agreed to use Rite Aid as a participating pharmacy provider. Additionally, Rite Aid negotiated two contracts with the Union after the oral agreement and could have raised and settled the issue during those negotiations. Having failed to do so, it was bound by its prior actions.
 
As this case demonstrates, oral agreements (even very old ones) can be binding in labor-management relationships. Management, therefore, should be wary of such oral agreements.

Bankruptcy Decisions You Should Know

Every now and then, a few cases that are clearly critical to commercial lending and loan recoveries float to the surface of the flood of bankruptcy court opinions. This is the first in a series of short synopses of cases that you should factor into your strategies.

Upstream Subsidiary Guaranty As A Fraudulent Conveyance

The case of In re TOUSA has been widely followed on appeal and is among the most significant in the country. Simply stated, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida found (1) that the granting of a guaranty by subsidiary corporations to secure more than $420,000,000 of new loans extended to the parent corporation, secured by liens on the corporate assets of the subsidiaries, was an avoidable fraudulent conveyance. The new lender provided funding for a compromise and settlement of prior secured debts, which rendered the parent company, in the opinion of the Court, the "most highly - leveraged company in the industry". TOUSA, Inc. was a large residential builder. Six months later, the parent company and all of its subsidiaries filed a Chapter 11 case. The fraudulent conveyance claim was advanced against the original lenders who received the compromise and settlement payment and they were ordered to return the $420,000,000 payment.

The Bankruptcy Code provides, in Section 548, that a trustee may avoid as fraudulent any transfer of an interest of the debtor (such as a lien) if the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and the debtor was insolvent at the time or rendered insolvent as a result of the transfer. Obviously, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may recover the property transferred, either from the initial transferee or from an entity which benefited from the transfer.

The Bankruptcy Court found that the subsidiaries were, in fact, insolvent at the time that the guaranty and new collateral were granted and that the subsidiaries did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the guaranty and liens. The Court found that the subsidiaries received indirect and minimal benefits from the transaction and rejected the contention that avoidance of contingent claims, avoidance of litigation or avoidance of imminent bankruptcy were sufficient consideration.

On appeal, the U.S. District Court reversed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court.(2) On further appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the District Court was reversed and the Eleventh Circuit essentially overruled the District Court and supported the original trial court decision. (3)

The Bankruptcy Court also discounted the viability of insolvency "savings clauses" in the subsidiary guaranty, which are not unusual in these transactions and purport to have the effect of reducing the amount of the guaranty by a sum sufficient to assure that the subsidiary remains solvent, thereby preventing a fraudulent conveyance claim. Neither the District Court nor the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the validity or effect of the savings clause.

The TOUSA decision may ultimately be little more than an obvious response to a refinancing occurring six months before a bankruptcy filing and the court’s judgment about the lenders’ due diligence. Nevertheless, the case raises several points that should be considered by both lenders and workout officers. For example:

(a) Due diligence on the financial condition and solvency of the subsidiary providing a guaranty must be thoroughly conducted and the creation of contemporary evidence of solvency at the time of the transaction is essential to the enforcement of the upstream guaranty.

(b) Incidental and intangible benefits to the subsidiary providing the guaranty, particularly in a setting where the companies are already stressed or in trouble, is unlikely to win the day in defending against a fraudulent conveyance claim. More concrete benefits must be identified - and documented. Some lenders resort to a "co-borrower" structure to work around the benefits/consideration problem. We urge caution in a co-borrower structure where there is ample evidence that the parties have no expectation that the subsidiary will borrow under the credit facility.

(c) The degree of foreseeability of subsequent financial difficulty must be assessed and a lack of credible evidence supporting the lender’s or recipient’s contention that they could not anticipate subsequent insolvency will be problematic.

(d) Credit underwriting decisions which rely upon the value of subsidiary assets and upstream guaranties have been common in the past, with the lender often arguing that the subsidiary received "indirect value", even though it did not receive loan proceeds. The TOUSA decision indicates that the possible prevention of an immediate bankruptcy filing is not "reasonably equivalent value", in and of itself. Upstream guarantys should be discounted as a credit support in the credit underwriting process, unless the lender can identify either (1) that the subsidiary will receive a direct and demonstrable benefit from the transaction or (2) the subsidiary was clearly, as shown by evidence, solvent at the time of the transaction.

(e) Receiving payoff proceeds from a transaction involving other funding sources, which include an upstream guaranty, may subject the recipient of the payoff to a fraudulent conveyance claim and to a refund of the payoff. Again, due diligence is necessary in any material payoff or settlement situation.

(f) Continue using "savings clauses" in upstream guaranties. Their protective value has not yet been finally determined.
____________________________
(1) Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA, Inc. v. Citicorp N. Am. Inc. (In re TOUSA Inc.), 422 B.R. 783 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
(2) 3
V Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA Inc. (In re TOUSA Inc.), 444 B.R. 613 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
(3) Senior Transeastern Lenders v.  Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA Inc.), 680 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).

What Every Business and Lender Should Know About PACA

PACA stands for the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, a Depression-era federal statute that protects growers and suppliers of unprocessed fruits and vegetables.  PACA creates a floating, non-segregated trust on buyer’s accounts receivable and inventory.  This provides PACA suppliers with a right to payment before all other creditors, including secured lenders with blanket liens. This super-priority status means that when a buyer purchases produce from a PACA supplier, it must account to the supplier before all other creditors.  Until the buyer does, the trust operates by placing a lien on not only the inventory derived from the produce , but also on accounts receivable and proceeds from the sale of the produce.  7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2); In re Magic Restaurants, Inc., 205 F.3d 108, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2000).  Since PACA can have harsh consequences for businesses and lenders that deal with PACA suppliers, it is important to be aware of its provisions.  Front-end lenders also need to be mindful of ways in which they can protect their banks and guard against some of PACA’s unforgiving provisions.  

To establish a PACA trust, the goods in question must be fruits and vegetables which have not been altered from their original state (i.e., cucumbers but not pickles, cranberries but not cranberry sauce, onions but not onion rings).  The supplier must also provide the buyer with written notice that the goods are sold subject to PACA, which usually is found on the invoice.  Unless the parties agree otherwise, PACA requires prompt payment (usually within thirty days).  Buyers who breach a PACA trust may be subject to interest and attorneys fees for collection costs and their principals may be personally liable if they knowingly played a role in dissipating the trust assets (i.e., spending it elsewhere).  That is one of the many reasons why it is important to be mindful of accounts involving PACA suppliers. 

Perhaps most importantly to lenders, courts have held creditors liable for breach of the trust when they “knew or should have known” that they were being paid with receivables that rightly belonged to the PACA supplier.   Consumers Produce Co., Inc. v. Volante Wholesale Produce, Inc., 16 F.3d 1374, 1382 (3d Cir. 1994).  In Volante, the court stated that lenders must return the receivables from the PACA trust unless they could prove that they were a bona fide purchaser for value who did not know the receivables came from trust assets.  Id; see also Albee Tomato, Inc. v. A.B. Shalom Produce Corp., 155 F.3d 612 (2d Cir. 1998). 

In bankruptcy, PACA’s impact can be even greater.  PACA supplier’s claims in bankruptcy enjoy the same super-priority status as they do outside bankruptcy, but they also are not subject to avoidance in a preference action.  Courts have held that, since the debtor is holding the funds in question for the benefit of PACA claimants, the funds are not part of the bankruptcy estate.  Hence, when the suppliers are paid in full from available trust funds, they are excluded from any new value defense to a preference claim.  See In re Arizona Fast Foods, 299 B.R. 589 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003).  Both the potential lender liability as well as the effects of PACA on a debtor’s bankruptcy estate should make creditors mindful of a the PACA trust. 

The good news, at least in Pennsylvania’s federal courts, is that there is a limit to how far the PACA trust can extend.  The trust corpus does not include vehicles and equipment purchased using PACA funds.  United Fruit & Produce, 242 B.R. 295, 301.  Moreover, real property similarly lies outside the trust since, like equipment, it is not inventory or proceeds from the sale of PACA products.  Chiquita Brands Co. N. Am., Inc. v. J & J Foods, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22847, *31-34 (E.D. Pa. 2004).  Thus, simply because assets held or purchased by a produce buyer can be traced to PACA trust receivables, it does not follow that those assets are part of the PACA trust.  Outside of Pennsylvania, however, courts have found that real property, equipment and even the insurance proceeds of a PACA debtor are subject to the PACA trust.  See In re Kornblum, 81 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 1996); J.A. Besterman Co. v. Carter’s Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 774 (W.D. Mich. 2006); In re Atlantic Tropical Market Corp., 118 B.R. 139 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); Sam Wang Produce, Inc. v. EE Mart FC, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13608 (E.D. Va. 2010).  It may not be long until the Third Circuit addresses this discrepancy. 

So how can a lender wary of PACA protect itself on the front end?  The best way is by including a loan provision requiring the debtor to keep a minimum amount, either in reserve or in the form of inventory, to cover eligible PACA claims.  That way, the debtor will have funds on hand to cover PACA claimants and the lender will be able to recover from non-PACA assets.